The State of Emergency Operations Centers in Colorado

Publication Date: 2023

Abstract

This study provides a descriptive account of organizational models used by emergency operations centers (EOC) in Colorado. EOCs are locations where activities are conducted in support of emergency incident response, including the management of information flow and communication, coordination of strategic decision-making, and activities across diverse communities and organizations. To date, knowledge is limited about practices for structuring and operating EOC’s at public offices of emergency management. A range of EOC structural models are promoted in the guiding literature and formalized instruction from the Federal Emergency Management Agency. By reviewing and analyzing organizational documents, this study examines the models used by offices of emergency management, including the factors that influence the choice of models and organizational perception of the effectiveness of the employed models. Our results indicate that the emergency support function model is the most commonly used, followed by a hybrid model, the incident command system model, and finally, the departmental structure and incident support model. We found no single model to be decisively superior; rather, different models are appropriate depending on personnel, resource availability, and the context of the jurisdiction. Although most commonly used, the emergency support function model appeared to be difficult to employ effectively when organizations have limited access to trained personnel, who are required to carry out the range of functions specified in the model. In comparison, the other models appeared better suited to handle personnel constraints.

Introduction

Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) are institutionalized elements of the U.S. emergency management system and a typical feature of public emergency management and homeland security agencies at local, city, county, and state levels. EOCs undergird incident response efforts by fulfilling key support functions, such as the management of information flow, communication, strategic decision-making, and activities across diverse communities and organizations that involve emergency management (Neal, 2005¹; Quarantelli, 1997²). Typically, an EOC is activated during an event of medium or higher level of scale and complexity—such as a severe snowstorm, a structural collapse, a wildfire spreading to inhabited communities, or a vehicle accident involving hazardous materials. The EOC is where personnel coordinate local emergency management services, law enforcement, and fire and utility responses; track resources; issue alerts and warnings to the public; monitor continuity of critical infrastructure; host local governmental and agency leaders; and communicate and coordinate with broader state and national level response efforts. Locating, building-out, staffing, and planning for the activation and operation of EOCs are essential emergency management preparedness activities.

Emergency managers began developing their EOC capabilities in the mid- to late- 20th century, when local civil defense and emergency management offices were instituted across the United States (Drabek, 1985³; Quarantelli, 1997). Distinct EOC organizational models have formed in the past two decades, coinciding with a period of increased professionalization of emergency management as field of practice (Cwiak, 2011⁴; Urby & MacEntire, 2015⁵). The National Incident Management System (NIMS)—which was first issued by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2004—is a federal effort focused on coordinating and standardizing national preparedness and response activities (FEMA, 2008⁶). Current predominant EOC models employ numerous concepts, terms and definitions in emergency preparedness that were codified and standardized under NIMS. And yet, despite NIMS explicit aims to clarify and standardize language and concepts in emergency management (FEMA, 2008), guidance provided by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) on EOC training and guidance has changed frequently and been inconsistent over time. As a result, there is potential for confusion among emergency managers about concepts and best practices for this important element of an emergency management program.

This study examines current practices in state and local offices of emergency management (OEMs) in Colorado, specifically in regards to staffing, structures, models used, factors influencing choice of models, and the organizational perception of the effectiveness of the employed models. By examining the range of EOC command structures currently used by Colorado OEMs—along with their strengths and weaknesses—our study seeks to identify critical gaps that could be filled by resources and initiatives based on existing best practices. Results from this project can help to enhance the capabilities of public emergency management organizations in Colorado and beyond.

Literature Review

The vital role of effective EOCs in emergency management is well-established in academic literature (Auf der Heide, 1996⁷; Comfort, 1985⁸; Drabek, 1985; Perry, 1991⁹; Quarantelli, 1997; Scanlon, 1994¹⁰; Sylves, 1991¹¹; Tierney, 1985¹²; Wenger, 1989¹³). FEMA has also long recognized the critical role of EOCs, defining them as “the central direction, control, and coordination point for emergency operations” (Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], 1981, p. 7¹⁴). To date, FEMA stipulates a formalized EOC as a prerequisite to receive an Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG), one of the prevalent sources of funding for local public offices of emergency management in the United States. An EOC is considered an industry standard element of a public emergency management program (Fagel et al., 2021¹⁵).

In the literature, there is debate as to whether and to what extent EOC practices, structures, and operations can, or should, be modeled and prescribed (e.g., Quarantelli, 1997; Ryan, 2013¹⁶; Shrader, 2011¹⁷). Quarantelli (1997) noted the wide variation in the configurations of EOCs and argued that no single arrangement or form “is decisively superior to any other” (p.52). In his view, what was important was not the structure of an EOC, but whether it fulfilled primary emergency response functions. Today, many scholars similarly contend that emergency management activities are most effective when tailored to each specific location and context and when wide range of flexibility is permitted (e.g., Jensen & Thompson, 2016¹⁸; Neal & Philips, 1995¹⁹).

On the other hand, some scholars have maintained that templates and models of EOCs are necessary and should be developed and promoted (Fagel, Mathews & Murphy, 2021; Perry & Lindell, 2003²⁰; Ryan, 2013; Shrader, 2011). Ryan, for instance, argued that the central functions fulfilled by an EOC fall under the umbrella of planning, which involves emergency management processes conducted under time-compressed conditions with limited information. During activations, EOCs commonly face challenges of asymmetric knowledge and experience, barriers to mutual awareness, uneven workload distribution, and disrupted communication (Militello et al., 2007²¹). And yet, the high human and monetary stakes compel emergency managers to produce plans that are accurate, flexible, and validated. Citing these challenges, Ryan argues that modeled structures and templates provide the necessary “high-fidelity and shared mental model” (2013, p. 1727) for overcoming individual cognitive limitations and uniting the actions of a range of players with widely diverse perspectives and backgrounds.

The position currently taken by FEMA (2018²²; 2022) combines these positions. FEMA trains emergency managers in specific models of EOCs, including the tasks and skillsets for personnel, while also stating that a diversity of EOC models “is necessary, given the unique missions, authorities, and resources of EOCs” (2018, p. 2). Also, a large degree of variation in EOC structures and practices comply with standardized requirements to improve the chances of getting EMPG funding.

Emergency Operations Center Guidance and Instruction

The guidance, instruction, and documentation FEMA has issued over the last two decades has been widely inconsistent. Under the initial NIMS conceptualization, the Incident Command System is discussed as the framework for incident response supported by separate multiagency coordination systems (FEMA, 2004²³). Under this conceptualization, a multiagency coordination system “is a combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications integrated into a common system with responsibility for coordinating and supporting domestic incident management activities” (FEMA, 2004, p.26). EOCs are thus considered a central element of these multiagency coordination systems. In the original NIMS document, EOCs are described to be structured “by major functional discipline (fire, law enforcement, medical services, and so on); by jurisdiction (city, county, region, and so on); or… some combination thereof” (FEMA, 2004, p. 26).

FEMA published the first revision of NIMS in 2008. In this version, FEMA (2008) altered the description of the relationship between incident command and the undergirding support structures, describing an array of relationships which, at times, appear contradictory. For instance, multiagency coordination systems are distinguished from multiagency coordination groups. The systems are described as “serving at an [EOC] or similar site,” while groups are described as both an alternative to an EOC and a potential senior leadership team, which may or may not operate within an EOC (FEMA, 2008, p. 31). Further, incident command posts, previously understood as field-level operations that are wholly separate from support structures, are now considered to be an element of support for on-scene multiagency coordination in the 2008 guidelines. FEMA also revised the description of potential EOC structures and organization as being modeled according to functional discipline, emergency support function, jurisdiction, or some other combination.

These terms, roles, and relationships of EOCs continued to be reworked in following iterations of federal guidance. In 2013, a new FEMA training was developed to instruct emergency managers in the relationships between incident command and incident support structures. The waters remained muddled, however, with EOCs being contradictorily described as both examples of and alternatives to a multiagency coordination group (FEMA, 2013²⁴). In terms of structure of operations, the training further outlined four possible EOC models: (1) major management activities, (2) incident command system structure, (3) emergency support function structure, and (4) a multiagency coordination group structure.

In 2018, FEMA unrolled a new set of trainings, documents, and toolkits specific to EOCs. Here, FEMA outlined three potential EOC structures: (1) incident command system structure, (2) incident support model, and (3) departmental structure model. Noticeably absent in the listing of models in this iteration is the emergency support function model. The following update released in 2022 continues to promote these same three structures (FEMA, 2022²⁵). But furthermore, in the 2022 training FEMA asserts that OEMs should not diverge from these three prescribed models.

Emergency Operations Center Models

In what follows, we draw on existing literature to outline the primary models used by EOCs. The models differ according to their historical origins, the functions specified, the number and the positions of involved personnel, and the lines of hierarchy that structure the personnel interrelations.

Incident Command System

Initially developed in the context of the fire service in California in the 1970s, the incident command system was established to manage emergency incident response in the field, with an emphasis on unity of response activities during complex incidents involving interorganizational response (Jensen & Waugh, 2014²⁶). The primary structure of the incident command system is a personnel hierarchy designed to provide clear and direct lines of authority and unity of command (Hanifen, 2017²⁷; Jensen & Waugh, 2014). Leaders at an on-scene incident command post develop and convey tactical strategies, objectives, and tasks to subordinates under a command structure. There is flexibility in the extent to which the structure is fully scaled, depending on the demands of an event. When fully employed, a designated incident commander carries ultimate authority, and under them are personnel are divided along the functional branches of operations, planning, logistics, and finance. In each of these divisions, an officer with specific training for that role, leads the branch and takes on responsibilities related to its functions. Since NIMS began in 2004—when incident command system implementation was mandated to receive federal preparedness funding (Department of Homeland Security, 2003²⁸)—incident command has become common for managing incidents nationwide (Jensen & Waugh, 2014). Because the starting point of NIMS training involves instruction in the fundamentals of incident command, it is well-understood by most first responders and emergency managers alike.

Importantly, the command functions that the incident command system is designed to fulfill are distinct from other key emergency management support and coordination functions, including the ones associated with EOCs (FEMA, 2018; Hanifen, 2017; Militello et al., 2007). Although not designed for EOC operations, some EOCs nevertheless apply the incident command system as their primary operating structure (FEMA, 2022; Larson, 2007²⁹; Lutz & Lindell, 2008³⁰; Ryan, 2013). One reason is its wide familiarity, as explained in FEMA’s Emergency Operations Center How-To Quick Reference Guide (2018). However, because the purpose of EOCs is to perform a completely different set of functions in support of incident management activities, many have criticized the application of the incident command system structure in the context of EOCs (Waugh & Streib, 2006³¹).

Incident Support Model

In recent years, a variation of the incident command system model designed specifically for EOC operations has emerged: the incident support model. In this model, the planning section of the incident command system structure is removed, while two sub-functions of planning—situational awareness and information management—are elevated to the level of their own functional branches, directly under the incident commander. The elevation of these functions represents an increased focus on their performance at EOCs, with the potential need for a full-time specialized EOC staff member to fulfill each function. This differs from the incident command system, where situational awareness and information management are only part of planning sub-functions that may or may not be activated and for which there may or may not be individuals with specialized skills.

Emergency Support Function

In comparison with the incident command system and incident support model, where tactical response activities are emphasized and hierarchy emanates vertically from an incident commander, other EOCs are structured according to the emergency support function model, which was developed by FEMA and used for its own response operations as outlined under the National Response Framework (Ryan, 2013). This is a flatter organizational structure with authority diffused across organizational partners (Kapucu et al., 2022³²). In this model, partner agencies are tasked with leading specific response functions as the primary agency. A designated representative for that emergency support function may be present to coordinate fulfillment of that function at an EOC if the scale of a given incident warrants use of that function. Nationally, there are 15 emergency support functions (see Table 1) (FEMA, 2018), and states commonly copy the template of the function and its numbering system in their state-level emergency operations plan.

Table 1. Emergency Support Functions

This approach is complementary to the Community Lifelines approach introduced and integrated into the National Response Framework by FEMA in 2019, where continuity of community functions (safety and security, food hydration, shelter, health and medical, energy, communications, transportation, hazards materials management, and water systems) is emphasized as the fundamental emergency management goal (FEMA, 2019³³). In addition to becoming the state-level standard for emergency operations, the emergency support function SF model has garnered increasing popularity at county and local levels in recent years.

Departmental Structure Model

Most closely resembling the emergency support function model is the departmental structure model. According to this model, a senior emergency manager directs operations to a designated staff member. In addition, representatives of partner agencies and organizations support specific functions. These partner organizations and the functions they fulfill resemble how the emergency support function model operates, with a primary agency fulfilling emergency support functions. But, here, the template of the full emergency support function structure is removed thereby relaxing some expectations of the broader emergency support function model. FEMA (2022) highlights the benefits of this approach, stating, “[by] operating in the context of their normal relationships, department/agency representatives can function in the EOC with minimal preparation and startup time” (p. 17).

Multiagency Coordination Group Model

Of the major EOC models, the multiagency coordination group model is the least constrained, with the model containing virtually no designated positions or required functions. According to the multiagency coordination group model, EOC staffing consists of a senior group of organizational or jurisdictional representatives who possess authority to commit resources and funds for managing an incident (Ryan, 2013). Together, these executive-level personnel gather and work at the EOC to make collaborative decisions in support of an incident.

Hybrid Models

Some EOCs combine elements of the aforementioned models. In the EOC Management and Operations instructional materials (FEMA, 2013), FEMA highlights one particular hybrid configuration: a hybrid ICS-ESF model. In this particular model, the divisions of ICS (operations, planning, logistics, finance) are the primary functional divisions. But within the operations division, ESFs are specified for carrying out specific support functions. FEMA notes in the 2013 materials a recent uptick in such models that combine features of multiple established models (FEMA, 2013).

Research Questions

This study is a descriptive examination of the staffing, structure, and operations of EOCs across the state of Colorado, structured around two primary research questions:

1. What mmodels do county and local OEMs in Colorado use to structure their EOCs?
2. What factors contribute to emergency management leadership choosing to operate their EOC according to a specific structure?

Research Design

This study uses a mixed-methods approach, drawing data from two sources—OEM organizational documents and surveys conducted with OEM personnel—to examine EOCs at public emergency management agencies in the state of Colorado. This approach leverages the availability of organizational documents that commonly contain the EOC model used. This information was supplemented with the direct accounts and perspectives of OEM personnel. Qualitative accounts of OEM personnel provide information on the factors that influenced the choice of model. A list of the research team’s activities can be found in the appendix.

Study Site and Access

We based our study in Colorado for two primary reasons. First, we had access to a contact list of all OEMs in the state through the Colorado Emergency Managers Association. And second, Colorado is our college’s service area. Using a representative sampling approach, the research team sent a request to all Colorado OEMs at local and county levels to view documents that contain details on EOC structure and staffing.

Organizational Documents

A list of all public OEMs in the state of Colorado was provided by the Colorado Emergency Management Association, which we used to contact all agencies directly by email. Out of the 118 agencies contacted, 20 responses were received from 17 counties and three municipalities. Typically, documents took the form of existing emergency operation plans. Plans commonly contained a section that detailed how the organization’s EOC was staffed and structured during an activation.

Survey

All agencies that provided organizational documents were solicited via email and phone call for voluntary participation in a follow-up survey. A total of 11 organizations participated in the survey element of this research project. The survey contained a series of open- and closed-ended questions pertaining to the structure and functioning of the EOCs; the history of the EOC; factors that contributed to the chosen structure and operations; and the perceived effectiveness of the EOC. Factors considered included the age and history of the organization, the number of personnel employed at the OEM, the number of persons typically active at the EOC, the structure of the EOC, personnel roles in the EOC, the number of activations of the EOC in the last five years, and the population size of the jurisdiction.

Analysis

We manually coded the data from both organizational documents and surveys. With organizational documents, we used a content analysis approach, beginning deductively with established EOC models. We subsequently incorporated additional models that emerged in the analytic process. With the surveys, closed-ended questions were numerically coded and analyzed with Stata 12 statistical software. Open-ended questions were coded and analyzed according to an inductive thematic approach, where we searched for themes related to factors that influenced organization’s use of a given EOC structure.

Ethical Considerations and Researcher Positionality

This study was approved by Arapahoe Community College Institutional Review Board on January 20, 2023. All organizations and their representatives solicited for participation in the survey element of this research project were provided informed consent that explicitly stated their participation was voluntary. Results were anonymized and all organizational and individual identifiers were removed. Study findings, reports, and peer-reviewed publications will be shared with all participating organizations and the Colorado Emergency Management Association (CEMA).

Results

Summary Statistics

Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the sample, calculated through cross-tabulations, with stratification according to jurisdictional level and EOC structure employed. We found the emergency support function model to be the predominant model used by OEMs in the study sample. This model is also the one used by the Colorado State Emergency Operations Center. The incident command system model was the second most popular model, followed by the hybrid EOC model. Next, the incident support model and departmental structure models were each represented by one OEM in the study sample. The multiagency group model was not represented in the sample.

Table 2. Emergency Operations Center Structure Type Across Office of Emergency Management Jurisdiction.

Table 3 presents bivariate descriptive statistics of EOC structure and jurisdiction population size. Results indicate that, of the available structures, the incident command system and emergency support function model were the most typically used in jurisdictions with small populations. Seventy-five percent of jurisdictions employing the incident command system model and 63.5% employing the emergency support function model had populations of less than 50,000 people. In contrast, hybrid and incident support models were more typically featured in jurisdictions with relatively large populations. Only 33.3% of jurisdictions using a hybrid model had a population of less than 50,000 people, while the one jurisdiction that used the incident support model had the largest population, exceeding 200,000 people. One potential reason for the finding of a correlation between large populations and jurisdictions using the incident support and hybrid models is that denser population increases tax revenue, leading to more resources and personnel and, in turn, a more dedicated, tailored approach to EOC structuring.

Table 3. Emergency Operations Center Structure Type by Population Size.

Table 3 presents bivariate summary statistics of EOC structure and number of full-time employees at the OEM. Data on the full-time employee variable were inconsistent, with missing values for five of the 20 OEMs in the sample. In the available data, however, we found the incident command system to be roughly evenly distributed, with 33% of OEM offices using the incident command system model having zero to two people; 33% featuring 6-8 people; and 33% featuring 9+ people. We also found this pattern to hold across the other models. For instance, 40% of OEM offices using the emergency support function model featured 0-2 people; 20% featured 6-8 people; and 40% featured 9+ people. Compared to the other models, the hybrid model followed a more modal distribution, with 50% of EM offices featuring 0-2 people. This clustering on the low-end tail suggests that the hybrid model is favored in offices with little-to-no full-time emergency management support.

Table 4. Emergency Operations Center Structure by Number of Full-Time Employees.

Survey Results

Table 4 presents the mean value from responses to Likert-scale survey questions related to the EOC performance, staffing sufficiency, best practices, and use of FEMA guidance. Responses ranged from strongly disagree (0) to strongly agree (5), and summary statistics were stratified according to EOC model.

Table 5. Office of Emergency Management Perceived Performance by Emergency Operations Center Model.

Survey results indicated that OEMs using the emergency support function model and hybrid models experienced challenges related to sufficient staffing, with respondents providing mean values of responses of 2.8 and 2.7, respectively, to the statement “Our organization has a sufficient number of personnel for managing emergency events in our jurisdiction.” Comparatively, OEMs that used the incident command system, incident support model, and departmental structure models were associated with mean values of 5.0, 4.0, and 4.0, respectively.

For the statement “Our organization is in line with best practices for managing emergency events, results indicate little relationship between an organization’s choice of model and perception of their use of best practices. For all models except the incident support model, whose sole associated respondent provided an answer of undecided/neutral (3.0), OEM representatives provided a response of 4.0 or higher to this statement. Because of the relative newness of the incident support model, and their being only a single respondent associated with the model, it may be that there is not enough experience with nor knowledge of the incident support model’s relationship to best practices.

Mean responses to the statement “Our organization is successful in managing emergency events in our jurisdiction” indicate that OEMs, overall, feel positively about their capabilities and their performance in managing emergency events. The only model associated with a mean value below 4.0 (the value coinciding with a rating of “agree”) was the emergency support function model at 3.8. One organization that used the emergency support function model reported “Undecided/Neutral” in response to this prompt—the lowest rating of all surveyed organizations. This same organization also reported “disagree” to both the statements “Our organization has a sufficient number of personnel for managing emergency events in our jurisdiction” and “Our organization receives sufficient resources for managing emergency events in our jurisdiction.” Most organizations using the emergency support function model reported they “strongly agree” with the statement regarding successful management of emergency events. Therefore, the minor deviation below the mean for the emergency support function model may be due to it being resource intense and thus challenging for OEMs 4with limited resources to successfully employ.

Responses to the statement “Our organization draws upon material/ instruction from FEMA/DHS to guide the structure and operations of our EOC” indicate that FEMA/DHS guidance is quite influential on organization’s EOCs. The overall mean value of responses to this statement was 4.1, and the only model associated with a mean value below 4.0 was the emergency support function model, falling just below at 3.8.

All but one of the respondents in the sample reported their OEM being recipients of EMPG funding. EMPG funding, provided by FEMA and disbursed through the Colorado Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, requires extensive planning and fulfillment of a range of criteria, one of which is having a formalized EOC. Notably, the sole organization that reported to not be a recipient of EMPG funding was also the only OEM in the survey that used the incident command system as their EOC structure. Given that the ICS structure is considered a viable model in federal guidance on EOCs (FEMA, 2018), this association is likely not due to the ICS structure failing to comply with the EOC requirement, but rather that OEMs that default to the familiar ICS structure are less mature and well-resourced.

Qualitative Survey Findings

Responses to open-ended qualitative responses provided insight into perceived advantages and disadvantages associated with operating EOCs according to the various models, as well as challenges and successes that spanned the organizations. In response to the short answer question “Describe why your organization structures your EOC as it does,” the county OEM that was distinct in both using the incident command system and not receiving EMPG funding answered, “it is easier to operate with [the incident command system] with limited people, as opposed to doing NIMS.” Responses to the closed-ended questions confirmed the OEM’s personnel limitations, which included just one full-time employee and was typically staffed by only three people during an activation.

Representatives of OEMs that used the emergency support function approach—the most commonly employed model in the study sample—described specific advantages to the approach. The most frequently cited benefit was that it easily integrates a range of response partners who are needed to maintain vital community lifelines. To illustrate, one representative noted that the emergency support function structure “is easier to understand” for agencies unfamiliar with the incident command system structure. Others said that it is also complements incident response at the incident command post when they follow the incident command system.

Yet several common themes emerged regarding challenges associated with the emergency support function approach. Organizations that chose other models frequently described the advantages of their chosen model specifically in relation to the emergency support function model. A representative of an OEM using the incident support model approach stated that “structuring the EOC to address specific incidents is more efficient for staffing as opposed to the [emergency support function] model”. This point was echoed by another respondent at an OEM that used a hybrid approach that alternated between the incident command system and the emergency support function models. They reported the full ESFs to be largely unnecessary and “difficult to maintain” due to lack of staffing. They further explained that the hybrid approach allows them to use the emergency support function model to specialize in support functions when conditions compel them, but alternately employing the incident command system in other circumstances, such as ones in which incident size and complexity are relatively low. Another organization felt the functions associated with the emergency support function approach were overly prescriptive: “…It is confusing for staff to fill an [emergency support function] position, because they do not always know what that function does, however if you tell road and bridge to support transportation, they understand it because they do it every day.”

Taken together, these responses bolster findings from survey results that indicate that staffing levels (i.e., personnel resources), and especially staff with training in EOC operations, plays an important role in EOC modelling, and that the emergency support function model is especially resource intensive.

In addition to the influence of personnel resources and availability of trained partners, another theme emerged regarding the influence of guidance from authorities and from peer offices of emergency management. In response to the open-ended question, “Describe why your organization structures your EOC as it does”, of the eleven respondents to the survey, five (45%) directly stated that they draw from FEMA trainings and resources to inform the structure of their EOC. As noted above, this same sentiment was expressed in responses to the survey question asking, “Our organization draws upon material/ instruction from FEMA/DHS to guide the structure and operations of our EOC”, to which most organizations agreed. Also of note, two organizations (18%) stated that they were influenced by the behaviors and standards exhibited by other peer OEM organizations in the state of Colorado.

Discussion and Conclusion

Taken together, results from this study provide no conclusive evidence that any singular EOC model is superior to the others. Instead, our findings align with what the literature has long contended—EOCs should be tailored to context. Nevertheless, respondent answers to survey questions identified some relative advantages and disadvantages of the various models. The emergency support function model appears to be very effective in maintaining critical community lifelines. However, it is intense in its demands for the required number of partners and personnel fluent in its application. For a well-resourced and mature urban and/or suburban OEM, this may be appropriate, but for an EOC in a rural area, with relatively few partnering organizations, this may not be feasible. Alternatively, organizations that use tailored approaches, such as the incident support model, departmental structure, and hybrid models, frequently described successes with model they used.

Many organizations reported relying on influence from authoritative guidance as well as peer organizations, indicating that mimetic isomorphism—mimicking behavior, in which established conceptual models are drawn upon—shapes emergency management practices at county and city levels. This is consistent with the perspective of mirroring operations proposed by Shrader (2011) and the need for mental models argued for by Ryan (2013). Given the influence of such modelling—and the specifically cited role of guidance from FEMA—high-level emergency management organizations appear to exert a strong influence on EOC practices at the county and local levels.

These two primary findings—that EOCs should be tailored to context and that models and guidance from authorities are highly influential on EOC practices—may appear to be in tension. The first finding suggests that EOCs should never be dictated from above, while the second implies that organizations heavily rely upon guidance. A synthesis of these perspectives is that models are relied upon to provide mental guides that are useful starting points for OEMs. They also help OEMs to cohere with incident response structures, which tend to be consistent with NIMS. Therefore, detailed guidance that is up to date, provides a diversity of model examples, and details information on relative strengths and weaknesses would be very useful for OEMs. Importantly, though, this should be used as guidance, not prescription, as OEMs should be critical and thoughtful in designing an EOC that is appropriate to their organization and the community they serve.

Implications for Practice or Policy

Our research affirms the current approach taken by FEMA and DHS, in which a formalized EOC is required for EMPG funding—with the acknowledgement that there is a diversity of appropriate approaches to EOCs (FEMA, 2018). However, our findings also indicate that the current guidance on EOCs provided by FEMA is outdated, with too few models posited and some that are largely unused included. In fact, the model we find to be most used in the field, the emergency support function model, is altogether absent in the most recently issued FEMA guidance on EOCs (2022). Therefore, it is our suggestion that organizations at various levels (from FEMA, to professional associative organizations such as CEMA) should invest in research regarding current best practices in EOCs. This research agenda should include examination of the particular contexts and circumstances that favor or disregard different models of EOCs. That research should then be translated and disseminated into updated guidelines to help OEMs make evidence-based decisions regarding the design, structure, and operation of this critically important element of their public emergency management program.

Limitations

There are several important limitations to this study. First, response rate for our study was low, with only 20 (17%) of the total 118 Colorado emergency management agencies providing organizational documents and 11 (9%) completing the survey. This introduces the potential for response bias, where responding organizations are systemically atypical of Colorado OEMs. Potentially, agencies that are more resourced and mature may have the time and personnel to participate in a solicited research project, skewing the generalizability of the findings. Finally, our study was limited to the state of Colorado, a state with specific hazard profile, albeit one largely typical of the mountain west region. Future research is therefore needed to determine if the findings of this study bear out in different geographic and social contexts.

Acknowledgments

We would like to acknowledge and thank the Natural Hazards Center and Arapahoe Community College, both of which provided financial support that made this study possible.

References