

# Private Choices, Public Harms | *The Evolution of National Disaster Organizations in the United States*

PATRICK S. ROBERTS

While emergency management agencies in the United States have evolved to provide more public assistance for a greater range of disasters than ever before, several trends in American government have led to confusion about the goals of emergency preparedness and the proper role of the federal government in a complex web of management organizations. Politicization, bureaucratization, deference to states and localities, privatization, and tensions between security and non-security missions complicate efforts at preparing for the shifting category of “disaster.”<sup>1</sup> The success the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) enjoyed in coordinating preparation and response efforts during the 1990s was the exception, not the rule. FEMA and its predecessors have always been small, coordinating agencies without the capacity to govern by command.

The diffuse, multilayered federal system of government does not provide much guidance as to who should bear the risk of disaster, whether individuals, states, localities, or the nation as a whole. Greater centralization of authority in the federal government and increased hierarchical control offers one alternative for how to prepare for future disasters.<sup>2</sup> Hierarchy alone, however, is a poor tool with which to prepare for disasters and emergencies.

Further privatizing government services and allowing citizens to assume greater risk as individuals offers another alternative already common in other policy areas, including health care and retirement insurance.<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, a democratic majority has reached a rough consensus that preparing for disaster is a shared national responsibility. In the 2008 presidential campaign, candidates from both major parties assumed that disaster response was an issue for the president and the federal government and therefore a public responsibility. Actually governing disaster preparation and response, however, requires a networked form of government that links federal, state, and local levels of government as well as private organizations. These agencies and organizations share common goals but are not subject to direct command.

Despite modest capacity and authority, at its best a national disaster agency has been an important node for establishing agreement about the broad missions and purposes of emergency management. FEMA was best able to manage risk when it enjoyed the support of the president, key members of Congress, and networks of emergency managers at various levels of government and in the private sector. Successful disaster preparation and response occurs not through command from above—reorganizations like the creation of the Department of Homeland Security breed chaos<sup>4</sup>—but through loose networks of formal organizations and informal professions that maintain broad agreement about shared goals and responsibilities. The development of emergency management in the U.S. context offers important considerations for future domestic policy and for the international context, where emergency management networks are even more fluid and multilayered.

## FROM CIVIL DEFENSE TO “PREPAREDNESS”

Understanding the problems faced by contemporary emergency management agencies requires exploring why emergency responsibilities were lodged in various levels of government and how over time the United States defined what constitutes an emergency. Well before the homeland security era, responsibilities for security from attack and security from natural disasters were intertwined. The first emergency preparedness agencies arose in response to fear of nuclear attack. The National Security Act of 1947 created the National Security Resources Board (NSRB).

The NSRB, along with the Office of Civil Defense Planning, was charged with providing a continuous state of readiness.<sup>5</sup> From the beginning, the Cold War was a national effort, as the Soviet atomic test of 1949 and the Korean War catalyzed support for a system of preparedness against nuclear attack. The media fueled a sense of vulnerability through stories about how the A-bomb could leave cities pulverized in a matter of hours.<sup>6</sup> Civil defense became a public and national effort, as people believed that Des Moines and Detroit, for example, not just New York City, were targets.

At the same time, managers with responsibilities beyond nuclear defense advocated a policy of “dual use,” so that the same organizations, training, and equipment could be used to prepare for both deliberate attack *and* natural disasters. Proponents of civil defense supported the idea because they believed that local agencies would be more likely to engage in nuclear attack preparedness if they could also use federal plans and resources to prepare for more frequent natural disasters. In 1948, Russell Hopley, the director of the Office of Civil Defense Planning, submitted a report to secretary of defense James Forrestal that announced the creation of a comprehensive civil defense agency, “a peacetime organization which should be used in natural disasters even though it may never have to be used for war.”<sup>7</sup> The Hopley report laid the groundwork for an institutionalized federal response to disasters. Soon after, the Disaster Relief Act of 1950 replaced ad hoc aid packages with general law governing disaster relief.<sup>8</sup> President Eisenhower issued the first presidential declaration of a major disaster in 1953 to help four counties in Georgia recover from a tornado.

Cold War emergency preparedness cultivated a shared sense of national risk by involving the public in preparation for nuclear war. The government funded large-scale programs, such as the construction of bomb shelters and the printing of instructional materials, but the thrust of the civil defense program was educating the public through the “militarization” of the home: Dad built a bomb shelter in the backyard, Mom prepared a survival kit, and the children learned to “duck and cover” at school.<sup>9</sup> The actual rate of participation in civil defense programs was relatively low, however. According to some studies at the time only 4.5% of U.S. citizens participated in civil defense programs.<sup>10</sup> Civil defense accomplished its goals more by cultivating awareness and a sense of shared risk than through active citizen participation.

Studies of citizen preparedness efforts criticized the U.S. effort for being ineffective and superficial. One prominent report noted, “Whether it was looked upon as ‘insurance’ or as playing a vital role in strategic deterrence, civil defense was never brought to a level of effort that would ensure substantial protection of the population, industry, and the economy in a nuclear assault.”<sup>11</sup> Critics, however, overlooked the effort’s most profound effects. Civil defense raised the salience of the Cold War for most individuals and involved citizens in preparedness efforts, whether or not civil defense would have significantly reduced losses during an attack. Natural disaster preparedness, in contrast, was largely the domain of government officials and specialized nonprofits, until a disaster occurred and individuals found themselves in dire straits. The basic organizational framework of civil defense in which the federal government provided loose coordination of state and local efforts continued to characterize emergency response in later years. Natural disaster preparedness, however, was not as prominent as civil defense during its peak, in part because natural disasters were seen as individual, isolated, and random acts of God, while civil defense was a national effort against a feared adversary.<sup>12</sup>

#### FROM AD HOC FEDERAL AID TO FEMA

By the 1970s, state and local governments had grown frustrated from navigating the many agencies responsible for elements of disaster preparedness. The Council of State Governments and the National Governors Association issued reports criticizing the “lack of a national policy for the management of natural, man-made, and attack emergencies.”<sup>13</sup> States had trouble accessing assistance from the wide range of federal agencies responsible for disasters, many of which were either stovepipes focused on a single hazard or in turmoil because of internal organizational tension between civil defense and natural disaster cultures.

The gradual nationalization of disaster policy until the homeland security era provides a lens into how the American nation grew from one of dispersed regional responsibility to one in which the federal government assumed greater power over resources and policy while still ceding more authority to states and localities than many other nations. The federal government has provided a measure of relief from major

disasters since the early days of the republic.<sup>14</sup> As the scope and resources of the national government grew, the federal government began to provide more money more frequently for disaster relief through greater appropriations and through reorganization, adding new agencies and programs in a piecemeal fashion. States and localities welcomed new resources, but their leaders grew frustrated with the scattered nature of federal disaster agencies and programs. The loudest call for the creation of a national agency to set disaster policy came from states and localities, who would nonetheless lose some authority in deciding how to prepare for and respond to disasters.

In 1979, President Carter created FEMA by executive order, giving the agency authority over emergency preparedness, fire prevention, civil defense disaster response, flood insurance, and continuity of government in case of nuclear attack. The new, independent agency reporting directly to the president and Congress was an amalgam of existing agencies and programs formerly housed in the Federal Communications Commission and the Departments of Housing and Urban Development, Commerce, and Defense. The idea of a single agency responsible for all types of disasters appealed to planners in Congress and the White House despite the uneasy relationship between civil defense and emergency managers. FEMA's first director, John Macy, faced the same challenges as earlier preparedness chiefs in attempting to unify efforts against many different kinds of hazards. Under his leadership, FEMA began development of an Integrated Emergency Management System that included "direction, control and warning systems which are common to the full range of emergencies from small isolated events to the ultimate emergency—war."<sup>15</sup>

As the Cold War waned, emergency managers dropped the term "dual use" in favor of "integrated emergency management" and then "all hazards" to describe the notion that, as much as possible, plans and equipment should be developed to address a range of hazards. This idea was just one among many in the policy stream, however, and it competed with the pet projects of divisions within FEMA, including bureaus responsible for earthquakes, fire hazards, and civil defense.

The creation of FEMA centralized previously scattered disaster agencies in a single organization devoted to the new principle of "emergency management" rather than the old approach of "civil defense," a

change as significant as the more recent use of the term “homeland security.” Emergency managers began to conceive of themselves as a profession in the 1980s, and journals, training programs, and college courses in the field slowly emerged. Partisans of emergency management might have thought that a single agency devoted to preparing for emergencies, of which natural disasters were the most frequent, would spell the end of preparation for deliberate attack outside the traditional military and security agencies. Several factors combined to maintain the strength of FEMA’s national security and civil defense organizations, however.

Terrorism was a periodic concern throughout the 1970s, and the 1978 National Governors Association report that helped lead to the creation of FEMA found it one of the policy areas in need of better coordination.<sup>16</sup> Ronald Reagan took office in 1981 on a platform that emphasized the Soviet threat, and he installed Louis O. Giuffrida, a former National Guard officer and director of a state counterterrorism and emergency preparedness institute, as FEMA director. Meanwhile, Congress approved funding for a new civil defense initiative. Giuffrida envisioned FEMA as the lead agency for counterterrorism, riots, and domestic disturbances, and though FEMA could not compete with more powerful national security agencies, it maintained a well-funded and secretive national security division.<sup>17</sup>

In a gulf that foreshadowed tensions in the contemporary Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the division between security and non-security missions shortly after the creation of FEMA added to confusion about the purpose of emergency management among civil servants in a variety of disaster specialties. Political appointees lacked the expertise to settle these disputes and in many cases brought new priorities that compounded confusion. Carter’s plan creating FEMA gave the agency eight political appointees at the outset, and by the end of the Carter administration the agency had thirty-one political appointees for approximately three thousand employees, one of the highest ratios in government. As a small coordinating agency, FEMA was not at the top of the Carter, Reagan, or George H. W. Bush agendas, nor was vetting its appointees. A House committee called FEMA a “federal turkey farm” because of its reputation as a dumping ground for political executives.<sup>18</sup>

The agency had multiple masters in Congress, deepening tensions among its multiple missions. FEMA reported to over a dozen

congressional committees, including the Senate Armed Services Committee, which confirmed appointees to an associate director position in FEMA. Though formally committed to developing a single approach to preparing for emergencies, the agency was divided among civil defense and national security programs (and their congressional patrons), on one hand, and natural disaster programs, on the other, which included fiercely independent bureaus, such as the U.S. Fire Administration. With its missions confused and its programs in silos, FEMA had difficulty mounting effective responses to disasters.

Before the creation of FEMA, states and localities that experienced a catastrophic event looked to the federal government primarily for financial resources to help rebuild communities after the disaster struck. With the creation of FEMA, state and local authorities had a single source through which to request assistance—part of Carter’s original plan—as well as a single agency to blame when disasters caught communities unprepared. FEMA made mistakes in its response efforts, but in many cases FEMA suffered blame for state and local failures over which it had little control. News stories rarely tracked the long, complicated process of establishing zoning regulations that might reduce the damage caused by disasters, but the media routinely covered major hurricanes, earthquakes, and floods. Local officials, the media, and members of Congress shifted blame from their own failures to prepare for disasters to FEMA’s failure to respond quickly and forcefully enough.

Disaster aid has always been political in the sense that politicians derive electoral benefits from delivering resources to constituents and from assisting victims of high-profile events. Presidents from both parties have been increasingly likely over time to issue disaster declarations. From 1953 to 1969, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson averaged about 1.3 major disaster declarations per month; from 1989 to 2005, George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush averaged 3.9 major disaster declarations per month. Economists Thomas Garrett and Russell Sobel have argued that from 1991 to 1999 states politically important to a sitting president had a higher rate of disaster declaration by the chief executive and that disaster expenditures were higher in states that had congressional representation on FEMA oversight committees.<sup>19</sup>



## FEMA REORGANIZATION AND REBIRTH

FEMA's poor performance in responding to a series of hurricanes in the late 1980s and early 1990s led some members of Congress to call for abolishing the agency. Rather than fold FEMA into another department, in 1993 new director James Lee Witt led a reorganization that demanded new independence for the agency and a newly focused disaster mission. With the advice of emergency management professional associations and a staff steeped in disaster work, Witt shrank the agency's top-secret national security division and obtained more resources to prepare for natural disasters more quickly.

In retrospect, it appears that FEMA's reputation had to hit bottom before the agency could achieve a consensus on how to reconcile its multiple missions and authorities. It is difficult to imagine the president, Congress, and the agency's many factions agreeing on a major reform if all the parties were not dissatisfied with the status quo and the agency did not face the threat of extinction. By 1992, FEMA's reputation and the morale of its employees had reached their nadirs, but the crisis created an opportunity. Senator Ernest Hollings called FEMA's staff "the sorriest bunch of bureaucratic jackasses [he'd] ever known" after the agency's poor performance responding to Hurricane Hugo in 1989.<sup>20</sup> FEMA's response to Hurricane Andrew in 1992 was so slow and so widely publicized as inadequate that President Bush, in the midst of an election campaign, sent nearly 20,000 navy, air force, and coast guard troops to Florida and asked the secretary of transportation to take charge.<sup>21</sup> Dade County emergency management director Kate Hale held a press conference in the midst of the Andrew aftermath in which she said: "Where the hell is the cavalry on this one? We need food. We need water. We need people.... For God's sake, where are they?"<sup>22</sup>

Faced with a media uproar, Congress convened blue-ribbon panels and began investigations into FEMA's performance. The chief culprit for FEMA's poor planning and slow response, the reports found, was its national security division, which set policies that hampered natural disaster relief. For example, FEMA developed a cutting-edge information technology system, but political executives refused to allow it to be used for disaster response because of national security concerns. The system would have proved useful in 1989 when the agency was overwhelmed with applications for assistance from victims of Hurricane Hugo and



the Loma Prieto earthquake.<sup>23</sup> At that time, FEMA dedicated about 38% of its staff and about 27% of its budget (about \$100 million, excluding the disaster relief fund) to national security emergencies.<sup>24</sup> Some of the agency's employees held security clearances while others did not, creating (at least) two competing cultures.

Drawing on expert reports, Witt proposed a reorganization of FEMA that unambiguously positioned the agency as the clearinghouse for natural disaster preparedness and relief programs. Witt reduced security clearances by 40% and moved national security programs for civil defense and continuity of government into a single, smaller division.<sup>25</sup> He made mitigation a central part of disaster preparedness and issued grants to states and localities to reduce risk before disasters struck by, for example, providing incentives to property owners to limit building in floodplains or to strengthen structures in earthquake zones. Studies show that a dollar spent on mitigation activities, such as strengthening building codes or relocating structures from floodplains, saves money that would have been spent on disaster response and recovery.<sup>26</sup>

The burgeoning emergency management profession, by then with regular conferences, academic researchers, and a few collegiate degree programs, offered the idea of “all hazards, all phases” as the intellectual centerpiece of the reorganization.<sup>27</sup> FEMA was a small coordinating agency with limited resources charged with an awesome task—preparation, response, and recovery for a range of disaster types. “All hazards” gave priority to programs that could be used for a range of disasters rather than a single type. Natural disasters had more in common with each other than with deliberate attack, and the “all hazards” organizing concept allowed the leaders of the FEMA reorganization to argue for more resources for natural disasters as an approach that provided more “bang for the buck” than civil defense and security programs.

The “all phases” portion of the concept attempted to involve the federal government before a disaster occurred in order to reduce vulnerabilities. It emphasized all four stages of the disaster timeline, including mitigation, preparation, response, and recovery. The agency formalized the concept when it developed federal response plans to coordinate duties in different disasters, and states and localities outlined plans along the same lines—essentially sidelining national security responsibilities and bringing natural disasters to the fore.

Congress passed legislation authorizing the reorganization that reduced the number of committees responsible for FEMA and the power held by national security committees as well as allowing FEMA to preposition resources in anticipation of a disaster, without waiting for a hurricane, for example, to make landfall. The reorganization also granted FEMA more autonomy over policy decisions, and Witt eliminated ten presidentially appointed management posts in the agency. “The White House didn’t like that,” Witt said, referring to the Democratic Party operatives who staffed the Presidential Personnel Office, “but the president didn’t mind.”<sup>28</sup> Now reporting to fewer congressional committees, Witt’s congressional relations office focused on educating key members of Congress about “all hazards, all phases” emergency management.

FEMA’s reputation soared beginning in 1993, as it demoted its national security division and delivered more money to states and localities through mitigation programs. From 1995 to 2002, major newspaper editorials mentioning the agency were all either positive or neutral, while in previous years they were nearly all negative.<sup>29</sup> Media accounts captured the agency’s improvements in preparation and response. While responding to floods in the Midwest in the summer of 1993, for example, FEMA used mobile communications vehicles that had previously been reserved for national security programs.

## SOURCES OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE

How did the agency accomplish such a remarkable turnaround, going from an object of derision on the floor of Congress and on late-night talk shows to one of the most popular agencies in government? An enterprising administrative politician, James Lee Witt used the knowledge and experience of the emergency management profession to give the agency a clear mission and improve its response to disasters. Disasters create communities of sufferers, and Witt offers a model for how entrepreneurial managers can structure organizations to serve these communities.

The challenge of transforming the Department of Homeland Security is greater than the challenge of transforming FEMA was in the 1990s because of the number of hazards and constituencies involved in the disparate field of “homeland security.”<sup>30</sup> Nevertheless, reformers today should take note that Witt did not take the goals of his agency as

a given but instead redefined what emergency management was about. The Witt-era FEMA took responsibility for preparing for disaster but avoided using intelligence to try to prevent attack, thus downgrading the agency's counterterrorism responsibility.

The term "disaster" is not self-evident, and social norms and the organization of government can affect what is considered a disaster.<sup>31</sup> For example, hurricanes count as disasters, while car accidents that occur over the course of a year do not. And deadly heat waves or droughts are only occasionally or after the fact referred to as disasters in the United States. The federal government is most concerned about preparing for disasters that are so rare that they overwhelm the capacities of state and local authorities. These disasters strike at an unpredictable time, inflict high and concentrated damage, and cause severe economic, social, and human costs in terms of lost economic productivity, social disruption, and loss of life.

Deliberate attacks can have consequences that resemble those of natural and technological disasters. A nuclear bomb could have some of the same effects as a nuclear power plant accident, and a terrorist attack against a dam could produce the same effects as a flood. *Preventing* a deliberate attack, however, whether terrorist or otherwise, requires a different approach than preparing for disasters. FEMA lacked the intelligence and law enforcement powers necessary to prevent attacks, but it risked being blamed for damage caused by nuclear attack or terrorism if it assumed responsibility for prevention and preparation rather than simply assisting in the response to an attack, as the agency did during Witt's tenure after the bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City. Deliberate attacks were far too rare and unpredictable and FEMA's authority far too limited for Witt to want to make counterterrorism part of the agency's "brand" to the degree that Giuffrida had planned for FEMA earlier in the agency's history. When the Federal Response Plan, the principal federal document governing disaster response, gave terrorism crisis management responsibilities to the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation), Witt did not protest. Fifteen years earlier, FEMA's leadership had tussled with the bureau and the Justice Department over who would control crisis management during the aftermath of terrorism and civil disturbances, and the lines of authority were murky. During the Witt era, however, FEMA focused its mission on preparation, response, and

recovery for natural disasters, and it played only a supportive role in terrorism and industrial disaster preparation and response.

Some theorists of bureaucracy posit that agencies seek “budget maximization” in order to expand resources and power indefinitely.<sup>32</sup> But FEMA’s leaders resisted simple maximization, refusing to oversee some anti-terrorism programs in order to focus the agency’s mission around natural disaster preparedness and response. Other scholars claim that agencies seek autonomy, or control over their mission and resources, so that they are able to use their expertise to satisfy a public need.<sup>33</sup> FEMA’s history best suits the autonomy model. Over time, leaders worked with Congress, emergency management professionals, and the staff of several presidential administrations to match the agency’s capacities to an achievable mission. Reducing the power of FEMA’s national security division and giving more authority to programs devoted to natural hazards were essential to the reorganization. In addition, the agency reduced the number of political appointees and the number of congressional committees to which it reported, giving more power to career civil servants.

The new Mitigation Directorate was a centerpiece of the reorganized FEMA, providing grants to states and localities to reduce vulnerability to hazards through moving structures, improving defenses, and other measures. If successful, reduced vulnerability to hazards would make response and recovery easier. In practice, mitigation wavered between being a program of free-flowing federal grants with few strings and a program to educate public officials and private citizens about how to protect themselves against disasters and, only when absolutely necessary, to provide them with financial assistance for specific projects.<sup>34</sup> The Bush administration deemphasized mitigation out of concerns that such programs were open to waste, fraud, and abuse.

Measuring the value of mitigation programs proves difficult because it requires accounting for non-events, but in this respect it is no different than regulating for other safety and security measures. Recent attempts to document the value of mitigation show that well-implemented mitigation programs reduce the damage caused by inevitable fires, floods, earthquakes, and other disasters.<sup>35</sup> The most comprehensive study, by the Multihazard Mitigation Council of the National Institute of Building Sciences, found that on average a dollar spent by FEMA on hazard mitigation

provides about \$4 in future benefits as well as saving lives.<sup>36</sup> To the extent that mitigation promotes a sustainable or resilient natural environment, it has benefits that are not adequately evaluated by economic measures. For example, preventing severe drought preserves fish, forests, and other wildlife and natural ecosystems that might otherwise be damaged.<sup>37</sup>

Though mitigation may be useful for defending against terrorist attacks—structural mitigation prevented the attack on the Pentagon on September 11 from being worse than it was—during the 1990s mitigation programs focused primarily on natural hazards. Creating a mitigation directorate moved the agency away from national security functions toward natural hazards that are more easily mitigated than prevented.

## EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT IN A HOMELAND SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Almost a decade after FEMA's reorganization, the agency underwent another remarkable turnaround—in the other direction. After a change in presidential administrations and then the terrorist attacks of 2001, a new FEMA leadership looked for a way to organize the federal role in disasters around a security mission. During the transition, morale plummeted, and many positions in the agency went unfilled. FEMA was famously criticized for a poor response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 as well as for waste, fraud, and mismanagement, though in Katrina there was plenty of blame to go around among agencies and individuals at all levels of government. By 2005, FEMA's capacity had deteriorated. The agency's attempt at defining its mission to match its capacities had fallen victim to two forces in contemporary government—bureaucratization and politicization.

Bureaucratization, sometimes known as the “thickening of government,” refers to the growth in both the number of people in government and the layers of hierarchy that separate them.<sup>38</sup> The federal government has fifteen departments headed by Senate-confirmed presidential appointees—secretaries, deputy secretaries, under secretaries, and administrators. Each of these executives has a staff of senior executives, which includes chiefs of staff, associate deputy secretaries, assistant under secretaries, deputy assistant secretaries, and associate administrators. These men and women, appointed and civil servants, are

the senior executives that make policy for the bureaucracy. The number of senior executives has increased from 451 in 1960 to 2,409 in 1992; 2,385 in 1998; and 2,595 in 2004.<sup>39</sup> The number may grow in proportion to increasing government responsibility or because of politicians' and public managers' desires for control. Whatever the cause, the kudzu-like growth of political executives makes navigating the bureaucracy an increasingly complex endeavor.<sup>40</sup>

While a desire for control and improved performance motivates bureaucratization, this "thickening" of government paradoxically frustrates control and accountability. After September 11, the Department of Homeland Security was created to refocus the bureaucracy around terrorism-related missions to correct the perceived organizational failures leading up to the attacks. The department absorbed FEMA as well as twenty-one other agencies responsible for missions other than terrorism, including customs inspection and fisheries protection. Political scientist Mariano Florentino-Cuellar shows how new terrorism missions detracted from the coast guard's other legacy missions.<sup>41</sup> Others have blamed the focus on terrorism for FEMA's shortcomings in Katrina. Representative Bill Shuster claimed that DHS leaders allowed FEMA's capacities to deteriorate "because its disaster mission cannot compete with DHS' terrorism prevention mission."<sup>42</sup> This view sees prevention and interdiction of attack as categorically different from other "all hazards, all phases" preparedness tasks, overwhelming other concerns when included in the same agency.

Some observers speculated that the Bush administration intended to shrink the non-security missions of homeland security agencies in order to fulfill a longstanding agenda to reduce the federal government's role in domestic policy.<sup>43</sup> In addition to bureaucratization, Congress and the executive attempted to politicize FEMA, or substitute their policy preferences for those of career civil servants. The chief vehicles for politicization are appointments, policy statements, and reorganization. Joseph Allbaugh, the political campaign manager whom George W. Bush selected to replace Witt as FEMA director, began his tenure by reducing mitigation programs and proposing new programs for terrorism preparedness. September 11 catalyzed the trend toward a terrorism-focused mission, and a new class of political appointees at FEMA ensured that the agency would revise its policies.

Critics blame much of FEMA's poor performance on politicization.<sup>44</sup> The agency had thirty-five political appointees by the end of George H. W. Bush's term, but after the agency's reorganization during the Clinton presidency, it had only twenty-two. By 2002, however, that number had grown to thirty-eight. Appointees filled top management positions, policy development and speechwriting jobs, and some presumably technical jobs in newly created positions in the External Affairs Directorate and Information Technology Services. Whereas many of the Witt-era appointees had long careers in emergency management, the George W. Bush administration filled FEMA's upper management with political appointees who lacked disaster experience.<sup>45</sup> In addition to FEMA director Michael Brown's much-lampooned prior experience as a lawyer with the International Arabian Horse Association, as of September 2005 other agency leaders lacked emergency management credentials before their FEMA appointments: the chief of staff, Patrick Rhode, formerly planned events for Bush's campaign; the deputy chief of staff, Scott Morris, was previously a media strategist for Bush campaigns. Neither had previous emergency management experience.

By then, FEMA's political appointees had to work through DHS appointees, and bureaucratization and politicization combined to make it difficult for career civil servants in FEMA to influence broad policy. The Witt-led reorganization drew on the knowledge of the emergency management profession to expand mitigation programs to reduce disaster risk and recommend the "all hazards" approach to get the most out of limited resources and claim authority for natural disaster preparedness against civil defense. By the time Katrina struck, however, FEMA professionals faced layers of political management, a political agenda that emphasized the terrorist threat, and entrenched state and local authority over disaster preparedness.

## LESSONS FOR PUBLIC MANAGERS

Over time, the national government has assumed responsibility for reducing risk in many realms of life. Disasters are no exception. Much of the authority for risk reduction, however, rests with states, localities, and private citizens who make decisions about construction, settlement patterns, and evacuation. FEMA is in a difficult position. It can claim credit



and win accolades for successful disaster preparedness and response, but it lacks the capacity to prevent and protect against major disasters without partners in state and local governments, private industry, and nonprofits. Few of FEMA's partners, however, recognize the extent to which the agency depends on other actors for achieving success.

After a period of poor performance and threatened with abolition, FEMA's leadership constructed a niche for the agency as the major natural disaster preparedness and response organization. The agency has some power to shape what constitutes a "disaster" or "event" deemed worthy of federal response, but FEMA is also at the mercy of larger trends. September 11 raised the salience of terrorism, and a reorganization left FEMA under the larger Department of Homeland Security, where many of its grants, organizations, and staff were restructured to address terrorism.

Disaster planners can look to the recent past to understand how FEMA might cope with impossible expectations for disaster preparedness. FEMA's resources were most closely aligned with its mission during the Witt era. The agency had an administrative politician who bridged the gaps among several groups. He connected civil servants to elected politicians by building strong relationships with each. He convinced politicians that a relatively independent disaster agency that drew on the resources of the emergency management profession would serve their interests through effective disaster preparedness for which politicians could claim credit. He listened to career bureaucrats and incorporated their ideas in policy planning. To strengthen the agency's influence over states and localities, Witt established a mitigation grant program that rewarded governments and property owners for actions taken to reduce disaster risk. FEMA also simplified the disaster assistance process by providing toll-free numbers, and Witt asked members of Congress to call him personally if they had concerns. State emergency managers praised these efforts. One said, "This is the first time we have had this coordination in my experience. . . . They think like we do."<sup>46</sup>

Successful emergency response requires more than a particular organizational form. People understand events through different "ways of knowing," and effective public policy acknowledges the differences in how people interpret events that are at the root of apparent disagreements.<sup>47</sup> Everyone agrees that hurricane protection is a desirable end,

but because actors have different understandings of what a hurricane means, they disagree about policy. To coastal property owners, a hurricane is a threat to their property. To meteorologists, it is a natural event that makes landfall in the United States roughly five times every three years. To oil companies drilling in the Gulf of Mexico, it is a risk to business and a potential interruption of service. Public managers must first ask how members of a policy network come to know what an event means before they can craft a policy solution that speaks to everyone who might be affected.

## EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT IN A NETWORK ENVIRONMENT

The peculiar institutional history of emergency management in the United States creates challenges not faced by other countries where disaster policy is more centralized. Nevertheless, the strategies for managing a fluid U.S. network of emergency management organizations are relevant for the even more diffuse international context. Development patterns contribute to increased disaster losses, but the authority to reduce these losses is diffuse. In the United States, emergency preparedness is primarily the responsibility of states, localities, and private citizens. The national government has had only a weak, coordinative role, even as expectations about Washington, DC's responsibilities in disaster policy have grown. The decentralized nature of emergency management coupled with the national government's relatively weak role provides an opportunity for FEMA to be an important node in coordinating a diffuse network.

There are several reasons why the national government should be involved rather than leaving preparedness to states alone or individual citizens. Psychologists show that people tend to underestimate their exposure to many low-probability, high-consequence events while overestimating their exposure to events like those in recent memory.<sup>48</sup> Furthermore, the probability of catastrophic disasters is uncertain, which frustrates efforts at rational planning.<sup>49</sup> Finally, in many cases, the federal government's land-use policies contribute to vulnerability, and the federal government bears responsibility for its contribution to creating disaster. For example, the Army Corps of Engineers completed a seventy-six-mile canal, the Mississippi River–Gulf Outlet (MR–GO), in the 1960s as

a shortcut for ships traveling from the river to the gulf. Studies of Hurricane Katrina show that it served as a funnel increasing the velocity of storm surges into New Orleans.<sup>50</sup>

Disaster preparedness and response occur through actors who rely on each other but are not subject to direct control. FEMA commands many of the headlines when a disaster occurs, but a study of the response to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center puts the agency's role in perspective. A total of 1,607 organizations participated in the response, and of these 1,196 were nonprofits and 149 were private firms.<sup>51</sup> Organizations with well-rehearsed plans seemed to perform well, but the event was so unexpected and the response so large that it could never be rehearsed precisely.<sup>52</sup> The relevant actors appeared to understand their roles and adapt their responses energetically if not spontaneously. Charities, for example, devoted resources to helping victims' families and to helping New Yorkers cope with the trauma of a direct attack.

Critics of the federal government's comparatively diminished role in public action label contemporary government a "hollow state."<sup>53</sup> FEMA, like other agencies, contributes to the "hollow state" by locating much of its capacity outside government, as when it enters into contracts with private firms to provide public services. These firms create a state within the state, a network of firms whose employees are not subject to government regulations but who perform functions once carried out by federal employees. Blackwater USA, a security firm hired by the DHS to protect areas ravaged by Katrina, receives 90% of its revenues from state government contracts, and the majority of its employees once worked for government.<sup>54</sup> Proponents of "contracting out" claim that private firms are more flexible and adaptable than government agencies, while critics complain that private firms are less accountable and contribute to the weakening of government capacity because their employees are more transient.<sup>55</sup>

In the years before Katrina, retirements, vacancies, and contracts with private firms hollowed out FEMA's core. By 2005, the agency had only 2,500 full-time employees and a vacancy rate of 15% to 20% that left the agency unable to handle the surge in capacity demanded during a catastrophe.<sup>56</sup> After Katrina, Congress approved \$62 billion for food, water, shelter, transportation, and other relief items. The aid needed to be distributed immediately, but FEMA had only approximately fifty

acquisitions personnel. In one of its first post-disaster actions, the agency hired a firm, Acquisition Solutions, to draft contracts. The contractor employed many former FEMA employees who were familiar with emergency management, but the speed with which FEMA awarded this and other contracts made the agency susceptible to charges of favoritism, waste, and lack of oversight in its Katrina contracts.<sup>57</sup>

It is worth putting concerns about the hollow state in perspective. Disaster management in the United States has always existed in a networked environment in which the federal government was a minor player. FEMA and its predecessors have always navigated shared, overlapping responsibility for hazards among federal, state, and local entities.<sup>58</sup> And despite its problems, public-private cooperation can be more flexible than centralized control. A network can more easily adapt to new conditions than a hierarchy if its nodes are given enough independence, shared goals, and trust.<sup>59</sup> (Networks also require structures of accountability, or they risk incoherence.)

For example, the rapid, multiorganizational response to the September 11 attacks at the World Trade Center site was judged a success. Like other networked emergency management efforts, the response succeeded because the organizations involved had a high degree of trust cultivated through long, collaborative relationships. The networked environment also explains why James Lee Witt's activist, collaborative, and connected management style succeeded. The best public managers in a networked environment are "administrative politicians" who routinely communicate shared goals to constituencies in and out of government.<sup>60</sup> The professions at the core of the agency's function provide a key vehicle for coordination and understanding across levels of government and among the private sector, universities, and nonprofits that neither pure centralization nor total privatization can provide.

## EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND THE PRIVATIZATION OF RISK

Defining an event as a "disaster" spreads risk and responsibility by forging a community of sufferers. The history of the increasing national role in disaster response and, more recently, disaster prevention, protection, and mitigation is a history of increasingly shared responsibility for risk driven by calls from citizens as well as subnational governments

for greater federal involvement. The national government now delivers more money and assistance for victims of more kinds of disasters than ever before. At the same time, the burden of disaster risk still falls heavily on individuals. The rich and well-connected can afford to bear risk and either sustain losses or organize to obtain government aid for recovery, while the poor and socially isolated are more likely to be devastated by disaster. Shifting the burden of disaster from collective organizations of government to private individuals is the central meaning of “privatization,” which can take many forms, from contracting out government services to be performed by private firms to the increased use of private markets for social insurance.

Since the early days of the republic, disasters have been a national concern because they spill across state lines and can overwhelm state and local authorities. Ardent libertarians might recommend that states form compacts to cooperate in providing emergency assistance in the absence of national resources. But if all states joined in a compact, they would act just like a national government. The Articles of Confederation operated through agreements among states, but the arrangement proved too weak. Today, states only rarely agree on mutual assistance compacts, probably because of high transaction costs. The national government can set standards and coordinate assistance in a cheaper and more effective way than agreements among fifty states.

While coordinating disaster preparedness should be a national if not international effort involving many levels of government and private entities, any level of government intervention that increases vulnerability is a concern. Recovery aid that, for example, helps people rebuild in floodplains or dense forests uses public money to subsidize risk for which only private citizens, typically home or business owners, reap the rewards. The threat of disaster is increasing as Americans build more valuable structures in more vulnerable places than ever before.

Individuals under-prepare for natural disasters because these hazards are what Peter Huber labels a “public risk.” These “are centrally produced or mass-produced, broadly distributed, often temporally remote, and largely outside the individual risk bearer’s direct understanding and control.”<sup>61</sup> Public risks are either high-probability, low-consequence events or low-probability, high-consequence events for which there is little incentive to engage in collective action without a dramatic focusing

event such as a major disaster. Private risks, in contrast, have either moderate probability or moderate consequences, and thus, people are more likely to take steps to mitigate them, such as fixing a roof leak.

Public risks, such as natural disasters or, without a focusing event, terrorist attacks, go unaddressed because they are outside the individual experience of daily life. They appear remote, if they are comprehended at all. As a result, citizens as individuals do little to organize to prepare for disaster. Nonprofits and private businesses face the same public risk problem and often fail to organize preparedness. Even experts and public officials failed to take the risk of a major terrorist attack in the United States seriously until after September 11, even though the risk was well known.

The national government provides a valuable service when it institutionalizes preparation for public risks. While some critics complain that the reorganization that produced the DHS was too large, in hindsight it may not have been large enough in scope. A national department could have been charged with reducing a panoply of risks, including terrorism and even scientific and industrial disasters, as well as with supporting states and localities.<sup>62</sup> Some procedures could successfully be “all hazards,” such as preparedness efforts and mitigating social vulnerabilities, while others would be more specialized, such as the use of intelligence to prevent attack. If the DHS is to move toward a more “all hazards” approach, it needs to develop methods, such as risk and vulnerability assessment, to help allocate resources and attention among threats.

The public, through state and local officials and fueled by the media, demands increased national responsibility for managing disasters that are often exacerbated by government policy. The national government’s role has always been much smaller than the collective role of states, localities, and private citizens in emergency management. Privatization actually increases the need for government coordination (though not direct control) over the growing network of organizations responsible for emergency management. Government contracts with private firms to provide public services are intended to improve efficiency and expand capacity, but contracts alone cannot address vulnerabilities at the root of increasing disaster losses. The DHS could learn a lesson from the past by matching its missions with capabilities, as FEMA accomplished, albeit briefly, in the 1990s. The DHS faces a choice similar to FEMA’s: it can put defense against deliberate attack at the heart of its mission or

expand its responsibilities to include mitigating and preventing the most costly and catastrophic threats of all kinds. To do so, national authorities must learn that they exercise greater authority when they clarify the missions and practices of emergency management and leverage the expertise of the professionals and subnational governments than when they attempt regulation or operational control.

For now, the tasks of preparation, response, and recovery rest with myriad organizations that are only loosely coordinated. As a result, long-term efforts to reduce disaster risk are haphazard, and the effectiveness of government response and recovery efforts is unpredictable and varies by region. After 2001, FEMA's capacity to organize disaster preparedness and response deteriorated. FEMA's rise and fall poses a puzzle for social science: why did elected politicians contribute to the diminished capacity of an agency that provided them with electoral benefits? The cynical answer is that agencies are designed to fail by narrow-minded politicians and bureaucrats who fail to consider broad national concerns.<sup>63</sup> Another possibility, explored in this chapter, is that achieving "success" in coordinating emergency management is difficult for a small agency in a complex and changing environment without the cooperation of other actors.

Even more puzzling than the goals of elected politicians is the result of FEMA's diminished capacity for American society. After a century of increasing public responsibility for disaster risk, an ineffective FEMA, by default, places more responsibility for disaster risk in the hands of subnational governments and individuals. As a result, states, localities, and individuals with limited financial and cognitive resources focus on responding to the most severe and the most recent disasters. Without an effective national coordinating agency, long-term efforts to reduce the damage caused by either frequent but low-consequence events or rare but catastrophic disasters will get short shrift, and disaster losses will grow.

## NOTES

- 1 E. L. Quarantelli, ed., *Disasters: Theory and Research* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1978).
- 2 Issued by the White House after Hurricane Katrina, the *Lessons Learned* report recommends that emergency management functions be centralized like the structure of the Department of Defense. Francis Fragos Townsend, *The Federal Response*



- to *Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned*, special White House report prepared by the assistant to the president for homeland security and counterterrorism, at the request of the president, February 2006.
- 3 Naomi Klein, "Disaster Capitalism: The New Economy of Catastrophe," *Harper's Magazine*, October 2007, 47–58; and Jacob S. Hacker, *The Great Risk Shift: The Assault on American Jobs, Families, Health Care and Retirement and How You Can Fight Back* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
  - 4 On the transition costs associated with reorganization, see Karen M. Hult, *Agency Merger and Bureaucratic Redesign* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987).
  - 5 National Security Resources Board, "Preliminary Statement on Guiding Principles and Program Framework for Mobilization Planning," White House Central Files, Box 27, NSRB Folder 1, NSRB Doc. 76, August 19, 1948, <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/hstpape/whcfcf.htm>; and Harry S. Truman, "Memorandum on Civil Defense Planning: March 4, 1949," American Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=13399>.
  - 6 Andrew D. Grossman, *Neither Dead Nor Red: Civilian Defense and American Political Development During the Early Cold War* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 54–57, 142; United Press, "Defense Lack Seen as 'Pearl Harbor,'" *New York Times*, October 10, 1949; *New York Times*, "Baruch is Critical of Defense Plans," October 31, 1949; and Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, *Civil Defense Against Atomic Attack: Hearings*, 81st Congress, 2d sess., 1950, 140–50.
  - 7 Russell J. Hopley, *Civil Defense for National Security*, report to the secretary of defense by the Office of Civil Defense Planning, October 1, 1948, quoted in Jerry Conley, "The Role of the U.S. Military in Domestic Emergency Management: The Past, Present and Future," *EMSE 232 Disaster Newsletter* (George Washington University Institute for Crisis, Disaster, and Risk Management) 3, no. 4 (January 2003). Also see National Security Resources Board, "Progress Report on Civil Defense Planning Under the N.S.R.B. March 3, 1949–March 3, 1950," NSRB, Box 94, Folder E4-12, National Archives. For studies of early civil defense programs, see Nehemiah Jordan, *U.S. Civil Defense before 1950: The Roots of Public Law 920* (Arlington, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, May 1966). Various civil defense leaders recall that the earliest conceptions of civil defense included defense against natural disasters; for example, civil defense agencies during the Truman administration cooperated with the General Services Administration to share knowledge about how to fight fires. See Richard Gerstell, "State Civil Defense Plans and Programs" (lecture, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, DC, October 22, 1963).

- 8 Thomas A. Birkland, *After Disaster: Agenda Setting, Public Policy, and Focusing Events* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1997), 49–50.
- 9 Laura McEnaney, *Civil Defense Begins at Home: Militarization Meets Everyday Life in the Fifties* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); and Elaine Tyler May, *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era* (New York: Basic Books, 1990).
- 10 Eric Klinenberg, “Are You Ready for the Next Disaster?” *New York Times Magazine*, July 6, 2008.
- 11 Harry B. Yoshpe, *Our Missing Shield: The U.S. Civil Defense Program in Historical Perspective* (Washington, DC: FEMA, April 1981), iv.
- 12 Stephen J. Collier and Andrew Lakoff, “Distributed Preparedness: Space, Security, and Citizenship in the United States,” in *War, Citizenship, Territory*, ed. Deborah Cowen and Emily Gilbert (New York: Routledge, 2008), chap. 6.
- 13 Claire B. Rubin, ed., *Emergency Management: The American Experience 1900–2005* (Fairfax, VA: Public Entity Risk Institute, 2007), 102.
- 14 Michele Landis Dauber, “The Sympathetic State,” *Law and History Review* 23, no. 2 (Summer 2005); and Michelle Landis Dauber, “Let Me Next Time Be ‘Tried by Fire’: Disaster Relief and the Origins of the American Welfare State 1789–1874,” *Northwestern Law Review* 92 (Spring 1998): 967–1034.
- 15 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA History,” <http://www.fema.gov/about/history.shtm> (accessed November 12, 2003).
- 16 National Governors’ Association, *1978 Emergency Preparedness Project — Final Report* (Washington, DC: NGA, 1978), 107.
- 17 Charles Perrow, *The Next Catastrophe: Reducing Our Vulnerabilities to Natural, Industrial, and Terrorist Disasters* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 55–58.
- 18 Larry Van Dyne, “Perfect Places for Those Hard-to-Place Contributors,” *Washingtonian*, November 1992.
- 19 Thomas A. Garrett and Russell S. Sobel, “The Political Economy of FEMA Disaster Payments,” *Economic Inquiry* 41, no. 3 (July 2003): 496–503. Other studies have found that a president’s decision to issue a disaster declaration is influenced by congressional and media attention. See Richard T. Sylves, “The Politics and Budgeting of Federal Emergency Management,” in *Disaster Management in the U.S. and Canada: The Politics, Policymaking, Administration and Analysis of Emergency Management*, ed. Richard T. Sylves and William L. Waugh, Jr. (Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1996), 26–45.
- 20 James N. Baker, Howard Manly, and Daniel Glick, “The Storm After Hugo,”

- Newsweek*, October 9, 1989, 40; and *Economist*, “When the Wind Blows,” September 30, 1989.
- 21 Bob Davis, “Brewing Storm: Federal Relief Agency Is Slowed by Infighting, Patronage, Regulations,” *Wall Street Journal*, August 31, 1992. In addition, Wendy Brown emphasizes the “popular and media discourse about relevant state and federal agencies (e.g., the Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA]), that came close to displacing onto the agencies themselves responsibility for the suffering of victims.” Wendy Brown, *States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 68–69.
  - 22 Peter Slevin and Dexter Filkins, “We Need Help,” *Miami Herald*, August 28, 1992.
  - 23 Robert Ward et al., “Network Organizational Development in the Public Sector: A Case Study of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),” *Journal of the American Society of Information Science* 51, no. 11 (2000): 1018–32.
  - 24 National Academy of Public Administration, *Coping with Catastrophe* (Washington, DC, February 1993), 53–54.
  - 25 Richard G. Trefry, *Security Practices Board of Review Final Report and Recommendations* (Washington, DC: FEMA, November 1992); and Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Which FEMA Personnel Should Be Required to Have Security Clearances to Fulfill Their Emergency Assignments?” (deputy associate director memorandum, December 18, 1986).
  - 26 Multihazard Mitigation Council, *Natural Hazard Mitigation Saves: An Independent Study to Address the Future Savings from Mitigation Activities* (Washington, DC: National Institute of Building Sciences, 2005), <http://www.nibs.org/MMC/mmcactiv5.html>; International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), *Measuring Mitigation: Methodologies for Assessing Natural Hazard Risks and the Net Benefits of Mitigation* (Geneva: ProVention Consortium, 2004); and Hank Jenkins-Smith and Howard Kunreuther, “Mitigation and Benefits Measures as Policy Tools for Siting Potentially Hazardous Facilities: Determinants of Effectiveness and Appropriateness,” *Risk Analysis* 21, no. 2 (April 2001): 371–82.
  - 27 Patrick S. Roberts, “FEMA and the Prospects for Reputation-Based Autonomy,” *Studies in American Political Development* 20, no. 1 (April 2006): 57–87; Wayne Blanchard, FEMA’s Higher Education Project file and personal communication, June 4, 2005; and Arthur Oyola-Yemaiel and Jennifer Wilson, “Three Essential Strategies for Emergency Management Professionalization in the U.S.,” *International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters* 23, no. 1 (March 2005): 77–84.
  - 28 James Lee Witt, personal interview with the author, April 15, 2004, Washington, DC.
  - 29 Roberts, “FEMA and the Prospects.”

- 30 Peter J. May, Joshua Sapotichne, and Samuel Workman, "Homeland Security: More or Less Coherent?" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, August 28–September 2, 2007).
- 31 Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, "'Securing' the Bureaucracy: The Federal Security Agency and the Political Design of Legal Mandates, 1939–1953," Working Paper No. 943084 (Stanford Public Law, 2006).
- 32 William A. Niskanen, Jr., *Bureaucracy and Representative Government* (Chicago: Aldine Atherton, 1971).
- 33 Daniel P. Carpenter, *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862–1928* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); and Roberts, "FEMA and the Prospects."
- 34 Rutherford H. Platt and Claire B. Rubin, "Stemming the Losses: The Quest for Hazard Mitigation," in *Disasters and Democracy: The Politics of Extreme Natural Events*, ed. Rutherford H. Platt (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1999), 69–110.
- 35 IFRC, *Measuring Mitigation*; and Jenkins-Smith and Kunreuther, "Mitigation and Benefits Measures."
- 36 Multihazard Mitigation Council, *Natural Hazard Mitigation Saves*.
- 37 Peter H. Gleick and Linda Nash, "The Societal and Environmental Costs of the Continuing California Drought," (Berkeley, CA: Pacific Institute for Studies in Development, Environment, and Security, 1991).
- 38 Paul C. Light, *Thickening Government: Federal Hierarchy and the Diffusion of Accountability* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1995).
- 39 Paul C. Light, "Fact Sheet on the Continued Thickening of Government," Brookings Institution, July 23, 2004.
- 40 James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy* (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 11–12, 218–20.
- 41 Mariano Florentino-Cuéllar, "Running Aground: The Hidden Environmental and Regulatory Implications of Homeland Security," Issue Brief (American Constitution Society for Law and Policy, May 2007).
- 42 Quoted in Tim Starks, "Fixing FEMA: A Flurry of Ideas to Address Autonomy, Control and Purpose," *CQ Homeland Security*, April 27, 2006: 1–3, <http://homeland.cq.com/hs/display.do?dockkey=/cqonline/prod/data/docs/html/news/109/news109-000002166895.html@allnewsarchive&metapub=CQNEWS&seqNum=2&searchIndex=6>.
- 43 Dara Kay Cohen, Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, and Barry R. Weingast, "Crisis Bureaucracy: Homeland Security and the Political Design of Legal Mandates," *Stanford Law Review* 59, no. 3 (2006): 673–759.
- 44 David Lewis, *The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and*

- Bureaucratic Performance* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, forthcoming).
- 45 Spencer S. Hsu, "Leaders Lacking Disaster Experience," *Washington Post*, September 9, 2005.
  - 46 Vernon Hyse, "High Marks for FEMA—For Now," *CQ Weekly*, July 17, 1993.
  - 47 Martha S. Feldman and Anne M. Khademian, "The Role of the Public Manager in Inclusion: Creating Communities of Participation," *Governance* 20, no. 2 (April 2007): 305–24.
  - 48 Robert J. Meyer, "Why We Under-Prepare for Hazards," in *On Risk and Disaster: Lessons from Hurricane Katrina*, ed. Ronald J. Daniels, Donald F. Kettl, and Howard Kunreuther (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 153–74.
  - 49 Richard A. Posner, *Catastrophe: Risk and Response* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
  - 50 Christopher Cooper and Robert Block, *Disaster: Hurricane Katrina and the Failure of Homeland Security* (New York: Times Books, 2006), 26–28.
  - 51 Naim Kapucu, "Interagency Communication Networks During Emergencies: Boundary Spanners in Multiagency Coordination," *American Review of Public Administration* 36 (2006): 207–225, 213.
  - 52 U.S. General Accounting Office, *September 11: Interim Report on the Response of Charities*, GAO-02-1037 (Washington, DC, September 2002); and U.S. General Accounting Office, *September 11: Overview of Federal Disaster Assistance to the New York City Area*, GAO-04-72 (Washington, DC, October 2003), 13–34.
  - 53 H. Brinton Milward and Keith G. Provan, "Governing the Hollow State," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 10, no. 2 (April 2000): 359–80.
  - 54 Klein, "Disaster Capitalism"; and Bill Sizemore and Joanne Kimberline, "Blackwater: On the Front Lines," *Virginian-Pilot*, July 25, 2006.
  - 55 Eric Klinenberg and Thomas Frank, "Looting Homeland Security," *Rolling Stone*, December 29, 2005, 44–54.
  - 56 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, *Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared*, 109th Cong., 2d sess., 2006, S. Rpt. 109-322, chap. 14.
  - 57 Griff Witte and Charles R. Babcock, "A Major Test for FEMA And Its Contracting Crew," *Washington Post*, September 13, 2005; and Griff Witte and Robert O'Harrow, "Short-Staffed FEMA Farms Out Procurement," *Washington Post*, September 17, 2005. To improve its surge capacity, FEMA could maintain a registry of pre-screened contractors with standing orders to provide services after a disaster.
  - 58 Patrick S. Roberts, "Dispersed Federalism as a New Regional Governance for Homeland Security," *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 38, no. 3 (2008): 416–43.

- 59 Max Stephenson, "Bridging the Organizational Divide: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of United States and International Humanitarian Service Delivery Structures," *Voluntas* 18, no. 3 (September 2007): 209–24.
- 60 Roberts, "FEMA and the Prospects."
- 61 Peter W. Huber, "The Bhopalization of American Tort Law," in *Hazards: Technology and Fairness*, National Academy of Engineering (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 1986), 89–110.
- 62 Posner, *Catastrophe: Risk and Response*.
- 63 Amy Zegart, *Flawed By Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).