S98-29
THE 1998 ICE STORM

In January 1998, Canada was hit with the worst ice storm that has been recorded. It was actually a sequence of three storms which resulted in an accumulation, ranging from 69.6mm in Ottawa, which is three times the historic high for a six day period, to a high of 110mm southeast of Montreal, which is five times the historic high for the same period. As a result of this storm(s), one-fifth of the residents of Canada were left without power, and 66 municipalities declared emergencies.

This session concentrated on the impact of the storm on Ottawa. Joe Scanlon reviewed and analyzed the response. He had several observations.

• Roads: There was a concern about salt shortages as well as problems with downed power lines that fell across roadways.

• Power: Power outages were extremely widespread. To compensate for the loss of power, priorities were established for distributing generators. The priorities were for: 1) health care facilities, 2) police and emergency responders, 3) individual housing where health was an issue, and 4) agencies helping in the response to the storm.

• Shelters: Only 200 individuals per night sought overnight sheltering; however shelters were packed during the daytime. As many as 2,000 persons used a single shelter for meals and showers. Firefighters, later assisted by police, volunteers, public health nurses, army personnel, and social services personnel, checked on the public to watch for persons in distress. However, no one was forced to move to the shelters.

• Water: Water became a major concern for public consumption in areas served by private wells. The Regional Municipality supplied fire stations which became the focal points for the delivery of water, firewood, and other supplies to the public.

• Clean Up: The amount of clean up needed was so extensive that the military was called in. This resulted in the largest peacetime deployment of the Canadian army in history.

• Outside Ottawa: The impact outside the Region caused Ottawa's response to expand to set up four additional EOCs and the staffing of five EOCs.

• Power Companies: Power companies first serviced their own customers and then started to assist each other. The Region was not formally involved in coordination or restoration of power or the setting of priorities; Scanlon characterized that as a serious problem.

Four areas generated technical problems with monitoring the response to the ice storm. Traffic lights failed, as did the traffic light monitoring system. The gas service monitoring system also failed, though the system itself worked. Widespread failures of electrical power complicated the monitoring system. The failure of individual telephone service was complicated by the failure of the monitoring system.

In conclusion, Scanlon made the following comments.

• The lack of the Region authority to force coordination among competing power companies affected response and recovery for the public;

• Rebuilding and recovery efforts are NOT including mitigation measures;

• The technology that we depend on does not function well in times of disasters; and

• There was a commitment of massive amounts of human resources due to the failure of technologies of delivery and monitoring systems for utility and communication systems. Many times the delivery system itself had not failed; however the failure of monitoring system(s) resulted in a locale by locale inspection which used vast amounts of human resources needed for the response effort.

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September 4, 1998