No Track

2008 Natural Hazards Research and Applications Workshop

Teaching About Hazards and Disasters: Strategies and Resources

Moderator
Tricia Wachtendorf, University of Delaware Disaster Research Center
Panelists
Deborah Thomas, University of Colorado at Denver
James M. Kendra, University of North Texas
Lori Peek, Colorado State University
Nicole Dash, University of North Texas
Recorder
Amanda Hughes, University of Colorado at Boulder

Summary
The panelists were asked to consider the following questions:

  • What are the more innovative things you’ve done in your teaching?
  • How do you balance application with research?
  • How do you balance a multidiscipline approach with your discipline?
  • How do you attract top students?

There is no “disaster textbook” from which to teach and journal articles for the most part are beyond the understanding of the typical undergraduate student. Consequently, it can be difficult to find useful and appropriate material for teaching hazards and disasters. The panelists each identified several resources they had found useful in their teaching:

  • Google images
  • Pictures—including an extensive photo collection showing how New Orleans communities have made a comeback
  • Audio and video clips—including those from National Public Radio or films
  • Local disaster experts
  • Local disaster history
  • Scenarios—what would you do?
  • Students and their own experiences with disaster 

Some of the more innovative teaching methods include taking an active service-learning approach where students engage in small group and single-person exercises addressing real-life issues, such as creating a state mitigation or family emergency plan. Having students think about these disaster issues in their own life helps them internalize lessons.

One suggested activity examined disaster pop culture by watching well-known disaster films. Students gathered in an informal setting (including popcorn) to watch and critique the films, discuss themes of disaster behavior, and outcomes. Students said it really grounded them and teachers found the classes to be a good recruiting tool.

Nicole Dash invented a game called “stratified monopoly,” which explores issues of social vulnerability. The game assigns a different race, class, and gender to each player with game rules designed to advantage or disadvantage them accordingly. In this version of monopoly, the game does not end when you run out of money—instead you rack up debt with other players. After the game ends, students are categorized by their debts, property, and money and given a fictional identity. Then students participate in a disaster scenario where they determine what happens to their new identity and create a recovery plan with other students. This activity gave students a firsthand understanding of the importance of social structure in disaster.

When attempting to balance application with research, it is important to work with those who create and implement emergency training, rather than criticize. Educators should focus on providing students with the theory they will need in their future careers. Theory is almost a dirty word these days, but it doesn’t need to be this way. It is important for students to have access to the principles of theory because much of what emergency managers do is transient and principles can sustain students longer.

One program encourages students to be active by taking amateur radio and Community Emergency Response Training (CERT) classes and be involved in disaster preparedness and response in the community. Students also visit their local Emergency Operations Center and participate in its activities. They are given access laptops with programs used by practitioners installed.

During the discussion several other educational resources where mentioned, including the following:

  • Video documentaries that focus on a particular event
  • Music inspired by Hurricane Katrina experiences
  • E-mails sent by NASA/NOAA containing news and pictures about the week’s disasters
  • Natural Hazards Observer
  • Instructor field work
Panelists were also asked how they attract and recruit minority students during the discussion. They gave the following suggestions:
  • Visit K-12 classrooms to tell them about disaster management
  • Offer classes for teachers about teaching disaster and Geographic Information Systems (GIS)
  • Create a student chapter of Emergency Response International—high school outreach
  • Bring disaster scenario drills to high schools with underrepresented students

Return to list

The 2008 Presidential Candidates and the Future of Emergency Management

Moderator
Richard Sylves, University of Delaware
Panelists
Thomas A. Birkland, North Carolina State University
Beverly A. Cigler, Penn State Harrisburg
John R. Harrald, George Washington University Institute for Crisis, Disaster, and Risk Management
William L. Waugh, Jr., Georgia State University
Recorder
Laura Banks, University of New Mexico Center for Disaster Medicine

Summary
Introductory comments:

  • The upcoming U.S. presidential election will likely impact the future of emergency management. The next administration might choose to enlarge or shrink the emergency management infrastructure, as well as the focus on terrorism.
  • The change in leadership might impact funding for NOAA and other federal agencies, and will likely change the way scientific evidence is used to guide policy.
  • Some attendees at the Natural Hazards workshop might have the opportunity to serve in the next executive administration and could influence funding for agencies and research.
  • The next administration might alter the relationship between state and federal governments regarding disasters.
  • Leading candidates have not served as state governors or had disaster declaration experience. The qualifications and experience of the vice president will be important.

    • The first question for the panel included a question about the future of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) placement in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its focus on terrorism preparedness. In response, the panel indicated these issues are more important to the disaster community than they are to the voting public and, by extension, to the candidates. Sen. Barak Obama, however, has indicated a desire to balance homeland security and terrorism readiness efforts with traditional disaster preparedness. He proposes removing FEMA from DHS and appointing a leader who would serve a 6-year term. Sen. Obama discusses risk-based and all-hazard approaches to preparedness and could strengthen the federal structure. Sen. John McCain, with his military background, stresses strong leadership and is likely to pick a highly-qualified candidate to head FEMA, although he has not discussed separating FEMA from the DHS. Sen. McCain seems more focused on terrorism readiness and frequently uses military jargon, such as “force multipliers” and “civil defense”, when discussing emergency preparedness.

    In answering a question related to hazard research under a new administration, the panel noted hazard research historically has been conducted in spite of administrations and hazard researchers are self-directed. Like disaster preparedness, disaster research is not a key voter issue. In addition, neither candidate has discussed disaster research in depth aside from terrorism threat research. Poor response to Hurricane Katrina was seen to have come from an action deficit, but rather than a knowledge deficit.

    Another question was related to catastrophic disasters and the impact a perception of failed disaster response could have on the next election. The panel noted failed disaster response has resulted in regime change in other countries, but is unlikely to do so in the United States—even though Hurricane Katrina has become a national symbol of managerial failure and incompetence. Sen. McCain sees the response as a policy failure, whereas Senator Obama subscribes to theories of national reports, which point to failure in leadership. The voting public, however, counts poor personal decisions and institutional racism among the failings. The concept of “electability” will likely be more important, demonstrated by New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin, who was heaped with blame after Hurricane Katrina and yet re-elected. Both candidates demonstrated an understanding of the issues facing vulnerable populations but could have different response strategies in mind. Sen. Obama specifically discussed environmental solutions, reconstruction efforts, 9/11 recommendations, and the use of Emergency Management Performance Grants. Sen. McCain expressed the need to use the military in catastrophes. Neither discussed future of the Stafford Act at any length. This might not be significant in light the majority of the disaster response is conducted by states through local responders and mutual aide agreements.

    Panel members also were asked what advice they would give to the next president. Responses included removing Stafford Act requirements that requests for assistance and damage reports be written before federal intervention. It also was suggested the next president “ask for forgiveness, not permission” when directing federal disaster response and that he fully understand “it matters” who is chosen to head agencies such as FEMA, NOAA, the Department of Commerce, and Homeland Security.

    Return to list

    Post-Katrina Federal Emergency Management Changes

    Moderator
    John R. Harrald, George Washington University Institute for Crisis, Disaster, and Risk Management
    Panelists
    Claire B. Rubin, Claire B. Rubin and Associates
    Lucien G. Canton, CEM, LLC
    Marko G. Bourne, FEMA; Patrick S. Roberts, Harvard University
    Recorder
    Melissa Berry, University of South Carolina

    Summary
    Panelists were asked to focus on the following questions:

    1. Were changes made by the Post-Katrina Reform Act necessary?  Were they sufficient to make the changes needed?
    2. Will the current organizational relationship between the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) work following a catastrophe?  Why or why not?
    3. Do the actions taken by FEMA/DHS address the problems that were observed in Hurricane Katrina?
    4. With these changes, is the role of the military in catastrophic disaster response adequately defined and described?
    5. Are we operating on valid or fundamentally flawed assumptions?

    The Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act was passed by the President in October 2006, more than a year after Hurricane Katrina. The Act, which went into effect March 2007, was created to amend the Homeland Security Act, reorganize FEMA leadership, and strengthen FEMA and DHS disaster response. Under the “new” FEMA, the National Response Plan was replaced by the National Response Framework (NRF). The NRF outlines how various governments coordinate national response to a disaster and describes the organization of authority in these situations.

    The highlights of the Reform Act mentioned by panelists include a larger budget, a provision requiring the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) to have emergency management experience, and better coordination of federal, state, and local government efforts before and after disasters. Unfortunately, the Reform Act did not resolve all FEMA issues. Since FEMA is still within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), DHS still has ultimate control of the disaster response, the FCO is still acts under the DHS Director, and the relationship between FEMA and the President is still lacking. The fact that the FEMA/DHS system hasn’t changed is the most significant issue. DHS is focused on terrorism and catastrophes and the coordination between the different scales of government has not improved significantly.

    Panelists made several suggestions for improving the “new” FEMA. Regardless of whether FEMA is removed from DHS oversight, further reorganization is needed. If FEMA remains part of DHS, then better coordination among the federal departments and state and local governments, as well as increased understanding of the staff responsibilities, is necessary. If FEMA is removed from DHS, it needs to be removed entirely, not piecemeal, or existing organizational and coordination issues will remain.

    There are two main issues that need focus moving forward—presidential oversight and state responsibility. The FEMA Administrator needs a closer connection to the president, as under previous administrations. Making FEMA an independent entity won’t give it more power, unless it’s assigned a cabinet position. State and local governments and other organizations also need to take more responsibility in disaster preparedness, response, and recovery. The federal government’s role is to support state governments when they are overwhelmed by a disaster. In the past, there was greater local assistance from local governments and organizations such as the Red Cross. More emphasis on local planning and participation in the emergency management cycle can improve disaster response and recovery.

    Return to list

    Improving Early Warning Systems in India: A Collaborative Program between India and the United States for Managing Hydro-Meteorological Hazards

    Moderator
    Nina Minka, USAID India
    Presenters
    A.K. Bhatnagar, India Meteorological Department
    Nilamadhab Prusty, International Resources Group Systems South Asia (IRG-SSA)
    Robert Jubach, Hydrologic Research Center
    S.K. Roy Bhowmik, India Meteorological Department
    Recorder
    Richard L. Krajeski, Presbyterian Disaster Assistance

    Summary
    India is exposed to many natural hazards, such as tropical cyclones, floods, thunderstorms, windstorms, heavy mountain snowfall, heat and cold waves. Multi-hazards risks are similar in United States and India. The Disaster Management Support Project was begun about a decade ago and has many aspects, including earthquake retrofitting, education and awareness, and institutional capacity.

    The National Weather Service for India serves all sectors and regions and meets specialized criteria for the World Meteorological Organization (IMD), especially for tropical cyclones in the Indian Ocean. Significant events have had high death tolls, such as the tropical cyclone of 2004, and the India Meteorological Department is responsible for providing four components of warning:

    1. Observations
    2. Data processing, such as numerical weather predictions
    3. Warning generation
    4. Delivery of warnings

    In-house study of warning needs and methods considered problems and gaps, understanding, timing and receipt issues, and other aspects. User concerns were studied regarding risk perception, as well as usefulness, timeliness, and delivery of warning issues. Timeliness was generally approved, but IMD wants to reduce the delay between data and issuance, by increasing processing speed. They hope to reduce the time from three to six hours to about an hour. The systematic change would also increase updating times.

    By 2010, IMD hopes to have all the new observational data assimilated into rapid forecasting.
    The project began with a workshop where all participants set priorities. NOAA trained 22 scientists and engineers in United States. The collaboration will continue after the project officially ends.

    Return to list

    Return to Index