Research to Policy to Practice Sessions
2008 Natural Hazards Research and Applications Workshop
- New Professionals
- Interdisciplinary Approaches to Assessing Risk
- Information Communication Technology and Disasters
- NASA DEVELOP Program
- Toxic Disasters: Long-Term Mental Health Consequences
- New Horizons in Dutch-American International Cooperation
- Global Holistic Analysis of Hurricane Katrina
- Quick Response Research—From Proposal to Possibilities
New Professionals
Moderator
Dennis Wenger, National Science Foundation
Presenters
Divya Chandrasekhar, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Jenniffer M. Santos-Hernández, University of Delaware Disaster Research Center
Recorder
Judith Steele, Consultant Services
Summary
Panelists were asked to present and discuss current research efforts.
In Understanding Stakeholder Participation in Post Disaster Recovery Planning, Divya Chandrasekhar attempts to understand the factors that influence stakeholder participation in post-disaster recovery planning, specifically the roles power, trust, legitimacy, and urgency of action play in guiding participation. She uses case studies and qualitative inquiry methods to examine participation by four stakeholder groups—government agencies, market groups, non-governmental organizations, and community-based groups—in three South Indian villages recovering from the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. Although she is still early in her work, she presented study objectives, a preliminary research framework, research setting, study methodology, and some initial fieldwork results.
Using an open-ended interview style to get participants to talk about themselves, she looked for evidence of collaborative planning theory factors to arise, particularly trust, shared values, and expectations. Her preliminary findings indicate a need to reframe recovery planning as recovery processes to better suit situational realities. Participation in these processes took forms ranging from direct participation to active opposition.
Jenniffer Santos-Hernández presented her work, Disaster Decision Support Tool (DDST): Population Distribution, Weather Technology, and Capacity Building, which attempts to provide a solution for emergency managers and other decisionmakers who often lack geo-coded data for their jurisdictions. Visualizing demographic and socio-economic data when lacking thematic maps isn’t an easy task, but it is essential that responders and response planners preparing for disasters can identify community members who are most at risk.
The DDST tool is an Internet-based, scalable mapping server for planners, responders, and other municipal, emergency management and state officials. Initially developed for municipalities in Puerto Rico, the tool gives local governments free access to a variety of geo-referenced information for municipalities. In the project, the DDST was used to map the most vulnerable populations, helping disaster managers understand where the most serious social impacts might occur during a disaster. The focus on population, rather than structures (as with HAZMAT), provides a clearer understanding of population composition and distribution and is a powerful tool for informing mitigation and preparedness.
In response to questions, Santos-Hernández noted a lot of time and effort went into gathering and preparing the data for analysis because the data quality in Puerto Rico was poor. An associated ethical concern is scores coded based on population characteristics, while very valuable for assessing vulnerability, could also be used improperly. The utility of the tool is dependent on municipal budgets and how use is defined and implemented. Nevertheless, Santos-Hernandez was optimistic the tool has great potential for Puerto Rico and other communities.
Interdisciplinary Approaches to Assessing Risk
Presenters
Ian Mitroff, University of California, Berkeley, Center for Catastrophic Risk Management
Karlene Roberts, University of California, Berkeley, Center for Catastrophic Risk Management
Recorder
Shali Mohleji, University of Colorado at Boulder
Summary
This session focused on the meaning of and obstacles to interdisciplinary research.
Panelists described how a study of Hurricane Katrina first led them to interdisciplinary research. After Katrina, a group of engineers at Berkeley wanted to apply for a NSF grant to research the reasons behind the levee failures. They realized it was not just an engineering problem and also realized natural hazards are not as problematic in a natural science aspect as when human influence adds to the disaster. As a result, the research team, who all had a background in crisis research, began to look at issues beyond engineering, as well.
The key to interdisciplinary research is to integrate and use a systems approach to solve problems. A systems approach incorporates all contextual factors regardless of discipline. One needs to move away from discipline-oriented research or multidisciplinarity (an assembly of separate specialties) and transition instead to interdisciplinarity (which integrates specialties).
The classic science model creates a hierarchy placing math and physics at the top and then moving down the ranks. Interdisciplinary research has no hierarchy, but has many different perspectives, so one has to be clear on all relevant outlooks.
In many ways, the academic world is structured to prevent interdisciplinary research. Universities stovepipe research in a way that does not welcome crossover or working with researchers from other disciplines. The discourse on common topics also varies among disciplines. A good example of this is found in the way the terms “risk” and “vulnerability” have different meanings in different disciplines. Academic journals are innately disciplinary, as well.
Even though panelists spoke about their efforts to create collaborative, interdisciplinary environments for graduate students, they realized that few academic settings outside their center allow for such an environment. One audience member, speaking from experience, said participants from all perspectives had to be invited to the table and communication needed to stretch across all boundaries. The key to success in interdisciplinary research is recognizing the significance of the social glue.
In fact, the social process needs to be recognized in interdisciplinary work in a practitioner culture, as well. For practitioners, interdisciplinary work often meets the obstacle of participant conflicts. Sometimes personalities clash. A common problem occurs when status and ego enter the process. These factors lead to participants who are unwilling to listen to or respect each other’s ideas. As someone stated, “Organizational behavior is the hardest of the hard variables.” Levels of knowledge sometimes conflict with levels of power. Status differences should not be a barrier, but if they exist, they need to be broken down so participants in the lowest ranks can contribute their knowledge and have it considered equally.
Questions were asked on how to develop a risk management strategy for high-need social industries such as power, water, and public health. Panelists suggested using a proactive approach versus a reactive one, as well as employing a risk assessment methodology that considers the probability and consequence of a given event.
Information Communication Technology in Disasters: Peer-to-Peer Communication and Social Media for Situational Awareness
Moderator
Bill Anderson, National Research Council
Presenters:
Jeannette Sutton, University of Colorado at Boulder Natural Hazards Center
Leysia Palen, University of Colorado at Boulder
Quintus R. Jett, Dartmouth College
Recorder:
Kathleen Vidoloff, University of Kentucky
Summary
Presenters addressed two specific topics: why peer-to-peer communication is significant in disaster and the critical design issues of Information Communication Technology (ICT) for disaster response policy and practice.
Technology plays a significant role in risk and crisis communication when responding to disasters. In the past, technology wasn’t readily available or used to communicate before and during disasters. For example, ham radios were commonly used to disseminate information to first responders and other stakeholders; now, there is a virtual revolution in communication technology. The Internet, cell phones, geographic information systems (GIS), and Blackberries are all options for communicating real-time information before and during a disaster. These new options allows for more effective hazards mitigation, response, management, and recovery.
By looking at three different cases—the Virginia Tech shooting, the 2007 California wildfires, and the New Orleans Gentilly project—researchers found several issues impacting the design and use of ICT.
While technology can play an important role in disaster communication, it is not the only answer. “Crisis informatics” is a new field emerging from peer-to-peer communication. Crisis informatics is a broad view of how information, technology, and people work together. Specifically, it looks at what relationships are emerging and how this information can shape an organization’s response to a disaster.
The current public information function during a crisis tends to be a unilateral relationship. The nature of communication is changing due to technology advances such as cell phones, personal computers, access to the Internet, and social media sites. Rim of the World, MySpace, Facebook, Twitter, pub/sub messaging (for publish/subscribe, where messages are sent (published) to receivers (subscribers) based on content classifications) are all examples of social media that provide information to people both inside and outside of the disaster.
By looking at the Virginia Tech shootings and the 2007 California wildfires, researchers see how those affected by crisis or disaster communicate with each other, as well as individuals outside of the situation. It is important to study how social media information could be used as data to inform organizational response in these cases. While considering the role this information could play, organizations may pose the following questions: First, how can this information be controlled? Second, to what extent is the information accurate? Other isues that could arise include whether or not information generated by the public is considered public information and whether it should be immediately available to incident commanders to help the response.
The 2007 shootings at Virginia Tech demonstrate peer-to-peer communication using social media Web sites. Even though the university sent out campus-wide e-mails regarding the shooting, students used their personal social networks to find more information. For example, students logged into Facebook to check their buddy lists. If a friend was online, a buddy icon is displayed. By deduction, students began to compile a list of friends who were not online and, therefore, might have been one of the 32 shooting victims. Additionally, different groups of students were able to compile a list of the victims, and while no list was complete, each list was accurate. This type of information gathering is defined as collective intelligence, which produces a distributed, decentralized problem-solving effect.
Collective intelligence was also present during the 2007 Southern California wildfires. Several interesting themes emerged from this data: responding to information dearth, coping with stress, information providers, misinformation, and error correction.
In the New Orleans Gentilly Project three major issues arose: representation of place, divides in the technology used by professionals and laypersons, and commercial innovations in technology. Representation of place focused on distorted information reported by the media. This misinformation about location and severity of the disaster can ultimately affect the levels of discretionary, external resources to the affected area. Divides in technology showcase the gravitation by professionals to complex, advanced system, while a layperson seeks out “low tech” items. Finally, commercial innovations in technology cannot be ignored. These innovations can drive which technological features are or are not used in responding to disasters and distributing real-time disaster information to the public.
Discussion focused on vulnerable populations that do not have access to these various forms of technology, as well as the potential for increasing information gaps among the disadvantaged. One panelist suggested that some developing countries are finding ways to make technology free or more affordable, but acknowledged this a long-term solution. Another discussion point focused on the definitions of intelligence and information.
NASA DEVELOP Program: Students Utilizing Earth Science Research Results to Address Community Needs
Moderator:
Steve Ambrose, NASA
Presenters:
Amber Richards, NASA Langley Research Center
Angela Maki, NASA Stennis Space Center
Derek Loftis, NASA Langley Research Center
Kyle Chester, NASA Ames Research Center
Recorder:
Amy Jo Swanson, NASA Langley Research Center
This session began with an introduction of the NASA DEVELOP National Program. DEVELOP is a NASA Science Mission Directorate Applied Sciences Program that fosters human capital development and extends NASA science research to local communities. The program is currently at six NASA centers and five state and local organizations. Emphasizing the development of human capital, the program gives technology training to graduate, undergraduate, and high school students at these locations. After participating in the 10-week program, the students return to their community to apply their training to local concerns and potentially leverage community partnerships.
A question was asked about what disciplines the students represent. Most students have an interest in applied sciences and are pursuing degrees in atmospheric science, chemistry, biology, environmental biology, public health, and computer science. Another question was asked regarding the longevity of the students and their projects. The 10-week program is offered during the summer, fall, and spring terms. Students interested in returning to DEVELOP must reapply. The largest trainings are during the summer, while students are completing summer internships. In the fall and spring terms, local high school and college students typically apply and work on continuations of projects from previous terms. Following the introduction to the DEVELOP program, three projects were presented by current students.
Angela Maki, an intern at Stennis Space Center and a Geography master’s student at the University of New Orleans, presented “ICESat Estimates of Forest Canopy Height Loss for Post-Hurricane Timber Damage Detection and Assessment Decision Support.” This project proposed to apply the ICESat satellite’s GLAS sensor to coastal forests and specifically see if we could detect canopy loss post-Hurricane Katrina. This was the main focus of the project. A subsequent study was done relating to the potential for forest fires after the hurricane versus before the hurricane due to downed timber. It then assessed the impact of this downed timber on the carbon budget for the study area.
After this presentation, it was asked if the team had looked at data from Florida regarding the 1998 fire season. Specifically, has timber damage in Florida from past hurricanes caused wildfires? Maki responded that, initially, the team looked at data from Florida, but was unable to use it. They decided to focus on the region affected by Hurricane Katrina instead.
Derek Loftis, an intern at Langley Research Center and an Environmental Science master’s student at Christopher Newport University, presented “Climate Change in Virginia: Ecological and Economic Impacts.” The objective of this project was to discover the impacts of global climate change in Hampton Roads, a region encompassing Chesapeake, Hampton, Newport News, Norfolk, Portsmouth, Suffolk, and Virginia Beach. The bodies of water of this region include the Chesapeake Bay, Atlantic Ocean, and the principle tributaries in South Chesapeake Bay: the James, Nansemond, and Elizabeth rivers. The cities that create Hampton Roads compose a critical portion of Virginia’s coastline. This coastline is at risk for imminent climate changes, water and land management concerns, public health risks, and ecological alterations.
After the presentation, it was asked if there were any recommendations of what the Hampton Roads region should do. In 2007, the team presented their findings to the Hampton Roads city planning commission. They have a 50-year plan that includes the consideration of building levees.
Kyle Chester, an intern at Ames Research Center and a Geographic Information Systems master’s student at the University of Minnesota presented “Pacific Region Integrated Climatology Information Products (PRICIP).” In collaboration, NASA DEVELOP interns at Ames Research Center teamed up with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) researchers to enhance their PRICIP project by integrating NASA mission data products. The student team is working to create an interactive decision support tool that visualizes hindcasts from past extreme storm events, such as tropical cyclones and high water events.
Two questions were posed—with the high water events, did they look at storm surge and high tide and what will the audience be for the final PRICIP product? Chester mentioned the high water events focused on high summer surf, strong winter winds, and extreme tides around the Hawaiian Islands. The audience for this product will be very broad, for example giving the general public the ability to look up past storm data.
Toxic Disasters: Long-Term Mental Health Consequences
Presenters
RoseMarie Perez Foster, University of Colorado at Boulder Natural Hazards Center
Edgar Villarreal, Texas A&M University
Recorder
Charles Mitchell, University of Delaware Disaster Research Center
Summary
Presenters focused on the long-term mental health consequences of toxic disasters and recovery from such incidents.
Toxic disasters are unique because the consequences often cannot be immediately seen or understood. This is problematic because, as research shows, how a community perceives risk will determine how to will react to a threat. These events are uniquely stressful because there is often no clear beginning or end to the effects of exposure. Survivors of toxic disasters can have long-term mental and physical health impacts. Communities exposed to toxins experience poor subjective health and use more medical services than before their exposure. Those affected often make momentous decisions such as avoiding reproduction and restricting daily activities.
Survivors can also be influenced by rumors that might spread through an affected area. Part of this is caused by risk not being well communicated or understood. Clear and successful communication is often key in combating the effects of these disasters. Examples of poor communication include Chernobyl and Three Mile Island. Included in the many mistakes of toxic risk communication are initial secrecy, failure to respond quickly, failure to appoint a single spokesperson, and sensationalism in the media.
There are also many psychological concerns in disaster care following a toxic event. The effects of quarantine and isolation can compound mental health. Containment procedures provoke anxiety and fear. As a result individuals can develop depression, anxiety disorders, lack of control, stigma, feelings of confinement or imprisonment and low self-esteem.
In the discussion period, the presenters suggested the following topics:
- How can victims be accommodated during containment to reduce unnecessary stressors?
- What are some strategies for compliance?
- What are some socio-cultural factors that could be taken into consideration during confinement?
New Horizons in Dutch-American International Cooperation: Water and Emergency Management
Moderator
Eelco H. Dykstra, George Washington University Institute for Crisis, Disaster, and Risk Management
Presenters
Stephen E. Browning, MWH Global
Wim E. Drossaert, MWH
Recorder
John Wiener, University of Colorado at Boulder
Summary
Eelco Dykstra explained the basis of the session by comparing flood risks in Louisiana with those in the Netherlands, including sea level, storm surge, subsidence, and riverine flooding exposure. Worldwide, 70 percent of people live in coastal and deltaic areas. While the United States has developed a systems approach to emergency management and has more operational experience with major hazards, Europe has focused on prevention for the last few decades.
To find the best of what the Netherlands and the United States might jointly assemble into an international toolbox of preparation, response, and recovery resources, panelists were asked to envision a Katrina-type “super storm” (with all its complexity and problems of interoperability) in Europe and answer the following four questions:
1. What lessons might Europe draw from the operational experience of the United States and other countries in planning, preparing, responding, and recovering from super storms?
2. What benefits could be derived from increased United States-European Union cooperation in science, engineering, and technology?
3. What is the current state of and future prospects for transatlantic cooperation in areas such as critical infrastructure engineering, remote sensing, earth observation, early warning systems, public broadcasting, or net-centric information technology?
4. How could a merger of American and European crisis management knowledge and experience benefit other parts of the world?
Mr. Drossaert noted four or more meters of sea level rise would claim half of the Netherlands, including the economic-core urban area (producing 65 percent of the gross domestic product). Previous flood events, including a 1953 disaster, had stimulated government efforts and investment in state-of-the-art flood defense engineering, but riverine events in 1993 and 1995 led to reconsideration of the premise that all areas should be protected. A new law in 1996 allowed different levels of protection for different areas. Now, with sea level rise inevitable, review has indicated expensive gaps in protection in this core economic area need to be closed. “Living with water” is a new concept for riverine threats, with increased attention to acceptable risk for different areas. Planning is underway, but is complex because of the 12 provinces, multiple water districts, and many jurisdictions. Building dikes and other complex flood defenses might be a well-known technology in the Netherlands, but coping with major disaster is not. Two days to evacuate a city like Rotterdam is a frightful scenario.
Mr. Browning addressed the issues of planning and leadership from his long experience as a senior executive with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Based upon his involvement with major events in the United States, including the World Trade Center destruction on September 11, 2001, Hurricane Katrina, and occupied Iraq, he has observed first-hand the consequences of poor preparation and assignment of leadership. Serious planning and practice exercises are known to be critical, but are often missing. Miscommunication is normal in disasters, surprise is ubiquitous, and only preparation and practice help. Another common mistake is misuse of the media, which should be a “force multiplier” for communication. Citing 72hours.org and the fact that most rescues are by neighbors within the first few hours after an impact, the importance of public awareness and development of self-reliance is clear.
Invited comment from Pete Rabbon and Karen Engel included the suggestion that the United States might be more usefully compared to Europe, rather than the Netherlands alone. They noted their disappointment with the limited success of planning and reports on past events. Descriptions and recommendations for the 2008 Midwestern flooding could have been achieved by renaming the 1993 reports on flooding there. In the Netherlands, flooding in the economic core will include flooding all of the locations of government, in areas from which evacuation seems extremely difficult. This problem of disconnection between science, applications research and implementation was linked to the need for increased self-reliance and self-preparation.
The audience was invited to join an electronic discussion group to continue with this inquiry and many were pleased to do so. It was clear that issues of identifying best practices in implementation would complicate the project, but there is enthusiasm. The comparison stimulated thinking about the factors that influence success and failure and the emerging policy shift toward a less ambitious preventive and structural role for central government.
Global Holistic Analysis of Hurricane Katrina
Presenter
William R. Freudenburg, University of California, Santa Barbara
Recorder
Andrew Rumbach, Cornell University
Summary
“Hurricane Katrina – what went so wrong?” was the main question of the presentation.
When examining Hurricane Katrina, we cannot focus solely on suffering after the fact, but must ask: what went so wrong in the first place? Common wisdom is there is something inherently strange about New Orleans and that during Hurricane Katrina nature “struck people” in a viscous and unpredictable way. In fact, people struck nature—to the southeast and on the coast, it was very much a natural disaster, but what hit New Orleans was actually a quite unnatural disaster.
What has changed in the past 40 years since Hurricanes Betsy and Camille came through New Orleans? Why did Betsy kill 40 people and flood 20 percent of the city, while Katrina killed 1,600 and flooded 80 percent?
The Army Corps of Engineers has tried to claim that water came into Lake Ponchartrain, but the evidence does not support that claim. Three canals breached during Katrina, and in reality the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MR-GO) was the real culprit of the disaster, Freudenburg said. MR-GO was constructed in the 1960’s and runs parallel the Mississippi river for 75 miles. It was a major economic boondoggle and was used by less than 200 ships a year until the damage from Hurricane Katrina closed it.
New Orleans was built from the natural Mississippi River levee outwards, toward the cypress swamps that surround the city. Traditionally, the city was protected by these swamps, which act as buffers against storm surge and the other effects of hurricanes. Long-term dredging of MR-GO led to destruction of more than 100 square miles of cypress swamps. Fast forward to Hurricane Katrina, where storm surges caused catastrophic failures in the levee systems.
Gilbert White noticed, many years ago, that the more money we spend on levees, the more damage we usually see following a natural disaster. We are really using the wrong terminology. The word “disaster” connotes a completely a natural event. The dominant hazard/disaster dichotomy is really not enough: why should they be called floodplains? Hurricane zones?
The literature is beginning to recognize that inequalities often worsen following a disaster (see Barnshaw and Trainor.) On a local level, we have created a “pass the buck” system for citizens trying to make claims for the loss property—developers send them to local governments, local governments send them to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), FEMA claims legislation protects them.
We hardly ever see housing developers blamed for creating hazards in the first place. For example, following the Mississippi River flooding near St. Louis, the community experienced a one-step forward and two steps back process: as we remove houses from flood plains, we’ve built even more.
Harvey Molotch, in “The City as a Growth Machine,” argues that elites and businesspeople—those with a profit-seeking motive—are the ones who “show up” in local politics, even if local governments do not recognize that they are not neutral in their requests or demands. Hazards are often created on a local level, and when business interests prevail over safety, our policies make it profitable to do the worst. Development, in our literature, looks like a “force of nature” but it is not, and should not be seen as such.
In another example, levee construction continues around Sacramento even though it is severely at risk. The levees would probably liquefy during an earthquake, yet many more thousands of homes are being built right behind them.
During the discussion period, several important questions were raised. If the fundamental problem is bureaucracy in capitalism, what is the answer? The speaker argued that politics, not bureaucracy, is the problem.
What about the remarkable trends in growth? How can we cope with them? The answer might lie in making sure the price tag of development reflects the true cost, risk included. Several more questions focused on this development-driven disaster theme. The speaker was careful to point out that the “inevitable” theme of development must be dealt with, because in reality it is often greed, not an Act of God that puts people in the way of disasters.
Quick Response Research – From Proposal to Possibilities
Moderator
William E. Lovekamp, Eastern Illinois University
Presenters
B.K. Paul, Kansas State University
Corey Reynolds, University of Colorado at Boulder Natural Hazards Center
John Barnshaw, University of Delaware Disaster Research Center
Jolie Breeden, University of Colorado at Boulder Natural Hazards Center
Recorder
Brittany Scott, University of Delaware Disaster Research Center
Summary
Presenters were asked to focus on the following questions:
- Basic overview of program guidelines with program officers available to answer questions.
- What is quick response research?
- What do you need to get and what can't you get later?
- How do you formulate practical research questions that are appropriate?
- Quick response research methods—not your regular methods?
- Entering the field: The expectations and realities. What now? What do you do when you get back from the field? Responsibilities to research subjects and reports to write. Also includes next steps and how to avoid being a "helicopter researcher."
Jolie Breeden and Corey Reynolds began with the basic elements of the Natural Hazards Center’s Quick Response Research Grant. The grants are funded by the National Science Foundation and the Federal Emergency Management Agency to allow researchers to quickly do field research following a disaster. They vary from $500 to $3500, which can cover travel, per diem, surveys, and hotel stays. They are not income-based and do not include stipends. Proposals will be accepted starting in September, and if one is granted, a person has from Jan. 1 to Dec. 31 to use the funds allocated to them (if available). The main goal of the program is to fund proposals quickly and get the information back out to other researchers as soon as possible.
The funds are a travel reimbursement program that has a fixed amount of money. Once it is gone, researchers will not be able to be funded. This is why is it important to contact Jolie immediately, following the strict guidelines which are available on the Web site. It was emphasized that an IRB or human subjects committee approval is needed to receive funding and to work in the field. There is also a 90-day policy that states that you have 90 days from the activation of your grant to submit your final report. You will not receive your reimbursement without this final report.
The session continued with B.K. Paul’s presentation on the work he has done using Quick Response grants. Since 1994, he has submitted 11 proposals to the committee and has received grants for nine. His work included research following tornados, flash floods, blizzards, cyclones, and droughts. Through this research, Paul has published numerous articles in journals, newspapers, etc. His methods of collecting data included field work, as well as face-to-face interviews. The challenges he found in doing quick response research were: delays in entering the field (possibly because of IRB approval), keeping track of all receipts so he could be reimbursed for the full amount of his trip, and sometimes a lack of cooperation while doing fieldwork.
John Barnshaw presented on methodological problems that may occur while doing this type of research. He stated there are three orders of problems: problems of research design, problems of research execution, and problems of field disturbance. One major problem was the fact that many conceptualize a disaster as an aberrant “event concentrated in time and space,” and many find interest in the short-term social change. This leads us to only have theories of the middle range. There is a strong encouragement to conceptualize disasters in a different way by focusing on the pre-disaster time period, the short-term social change, as well as the long-term social changes. Some suggestions for answers to these problems are re-conceptualizing disasters across time and space (Oliver-Smith, 1998), using broader methodological frameworks (Brodie et all 2006; Phillips, 1997), and using broader theoretical frameworks (Peacock et al, 1997).
In the discussion period, many topics were raised including the possibility of collecting data in an area where a disaster is likely to happen—this will allow researchers to gain the full perspective of social change. Some things that might be collected in advance are studies on how teams will work when they are deployed to a disaster area. There can also be rare situations in which someone can be deployed when a disaster is imminent to study and understand how the community prepares, then go back to study the same area after the disaster.
The terms of funding were also discussed and the panelists stated that there could be funding for a center that conducts Internet and/or phone surveys if it is applicable to the study. For example, they might fund these surveys in a disaster such as a blizzard, but it is impractical to conduct a survey during a hurricane.
The protocol to enter shelters and interview those residing there was addressed. It was stated that all actions depend on the willingness of those running the shelters. You must have IRB approval, always act with respect, and have assistance at all times.
It is also important to note that these grants do not provide medical insurance to those traveling and working in the field, but you may receive travel coverage and medical insurance as an employee of your university.