The Rise of the Zero Responder: Grassroots Disaster Response After Hurricane Ian

Christa L. Remington
University of South Florida

Charity Remington
The Center For Leadership Research & Action

Cayla Duckworth
University of South Florida

Savannah Havird
University of South Florida

Publication Date: 2026

Abstract

In the aftermath of Hurricane Ian, civilians who assumed first-response functions before, or in place of, formal emergency response systems- known as zero responders, took a prominent role in grassroots response efforts by rescuing stranded victims, providing meals, and distributing supplies. This study draws on a mixed-methods project including surveys (n = 192), interviews (n = 64), and secondary sources (n = 272) to investigate the role of social capital—defined as the networks of trust and relationships that enable people to access resources—in disaster response. Specifically, it examines how and why zero responders participated in the early aftermath of the storm. The study addresses two questions: (a) what role did individuals play in grassroots response efforts after Hurricane Ian? (b) which types of networks were used to access social capital following Hurricane Ian? Findings show that zero responders assisted their community when the government was unable or unwilling to respond effectively, or when distrust limited citizens' use of official resources. Bonding social capital (close ties among family and neighbors) was most evident in rural communities with a strong collective identity, while linking social capital (connections to institutions and authorities) was often facilitated through social media. This study offers valuable insights for both local governments and first responders by highlighting how communities can leverage social capital, build stronger ties with potential zero responders, and reduce the risk of conflict during response efforts.


Introduction

On September 28, 2022, Hurricane Ian made landfall on the western coast of Florida as a strong Category 4 storm. It was large and slow-moving, with winds of up to 150 mph and a storm surge of up to 18 feet. The storm caused historic flooding and destruction as it moved inland. In DeSoto County, the Peace River reached an all-time record crest, cutting off highways in and out of the county, trapping citizens in their homes, destroying properties, and killing livestock (Gans, 20221; Sowers, 20222). In the immediate aftermath of the hurricane, individuals rose to take action in impacted counties, immediately responding by using personal boats to rescue stranded victims, providing food and water, distributing supplies, and relocating livestock from flooded pastures (Lauren, 20223; Lawrence, 20224). These individuals are known as zero responders, a term used in emergency medicine to differentiate spontaneous helpers from official aid (i.e., the Federal Emergency Management Agency, first response agencies) and large nongovernmental and nonprofit organizations involved in the response. (i.e., Red Cross and United Way) (Cocking et al., 20135).

Recent trends suggest that smaller nonprofit organizations, community groups, and local businesses are taking increasingly prominent roles in disaster response (Fraser, 20226; Mekita, 20227). Zero responders often spread the word about available resources through nontraditional means of communication such as social media, local community groups, and word of mouth. Widespread reliance on informal communication channels and unofficial response efforts indicates not only a perceived gap in official support but also diminished trust in government resources (Pew Research Center8, 2022). This increase is also reflected by the heightened sense of self-reliance that Floridians experienced after the COVID-19 pandemic (Remington, 20209).

Social capital, which refers to social ties and networks of relationships that give individuals access to resources, is an essential component of community health, particularly during crises (Bourdieu, 198010; Lin, 200111). Prior studies show the value of social capital in lowering disaster death tolls (Ye & Aldrich, 201912), predicting community resilience, and shaping post-disaster conditions (Aldrich & Meyer, 201513). With increasing disaster impacts (Smith, 202414), documented shortages of first responders (U.S. Fire Administration [USFA], 202415; National Association of Emergency Medical Technicians [NAEMT], 202416), and co-occurring crises straining formal resources (U.S. Government Accountability Office [GAO], 202317), individuals' ability to leverage social capital for post-disaster help will continue to grow in importance.

Using a mixed-methods approach, including surveys, interviews, and an analysis of secondary sources, this study aims to investigate the role of social capital in disaster response by capturing how zero responders participated in the early aftermath of Hurricane Ian. The findings from this research can help local authorities and first responders better understand how communities mobilize different types of social capital. This can help the official response identify practical ways to leverage zero responders, including assisting public officials in supporting those who may be excluded from community ties, such as immigrants, unhoused individuals, and undocumented persons.

Literature Review

Social Capital and Disasters

Social capital is defined as the "resources embedded in a social structure which are accessed and/or mobilized in purposive actions" (Lin, 2001, p. 2911). This includes how resources are embedded within the social structure, their accessibility, and their use toward achieving goals (Claridge, 201318). Social ties are commonly described in three ways: bonding (close ties among family, neighbors, and friends, helping people “get by”), bridging (links across groups, helping people “get ahead”), and linking (connections to power or authority, facilitating access to resources) (Putnam, 200019; Aldrich, 201220; Aldrich & Meyer, 201513).

Disasters make these forms of social capital especially visible by activating latent networks and intensifying patterns of interaction that shape access to information and resources. Bonding ties, characterized by strong, dense relationships, often provide urgent, localized assistance such as neighbors checking in, sharing food, or offering transport (Aldrich et al., 201821). Bridging ties connect individuals across more diverse social groups, enabling the flow of information and mobilization of resources beyond a single neighborhood, while linking ties extend these connections vertically to formal authorities or external organizations for shelter, aid, or recovery support (Aldrich, 201220; Kyne & Aldrich, 2019). These broader, cross-cutting connections are particularly important for accessing new information and external assistance in disrupted environments (Granovetter, 1983). As a result, communities with strong bridging and linking capital tend to be more resilient, especially in contexts marked by inequality where access to formal resources is uneven (Behera, 202122; Hawkins & Maurer, 201023).

Social capital’s relevance to disasters was first emphasized by Nakagawa and Shaw (2004), with subsequent studies confirming that strong networks enhance recovery (Dynes, 200624; Chamlee-Wright & Storr, 200925). Aldrich (2018) further demonstrated that bonding ties could be lifesaving in the immediate aftermath, as neighbors and friends often arrived before formal responders. More recent research highlights the role of social capital in shaping disaster governance, demonstrating how networks of trust and reciprocity among communities, local leaders, and institutions support adaptive and equitable recovery across diverse contexts (Melo Zurita et al., 201826; Beckham et al., 202327). Collectively, these studies show that social capital not only facilitates immediate response efforts but also strengthens long-term resilience by linking informal community action with formal governance structures.

Digital Social Capital

Traditionally, social capital develops through face-to-face relationships. Today, digital platforms, such as Facebook, Instagram, and NextDoor, serve as important tools for sustaining and expanding networks (Weiler et al., 202228). During disasters, these spaces allow residents to exchange information, identify immediate needs, and coordinate aid (Kumari & Frazier, 202129; de Zúñiga et al., 201730). Social platforms often circulate information faster than official alerts, making them a primary source for many residents (Shearer, 202131). However, digital divides persist, as undocumented residents, unhoused individuals, and low-income households often lack equal access to technology and the internet, reinforcing preexisting inequities (Weiler et al., 202228).

Grassroots Action, Co-Production, and Zero Responders

Grassroots actors frequently emerge after disasters, using local knowledge to fill gaps in aid and sometimes activating communities to co-produce recovery services with formal responders (Aijazi, 201532; Rayamajhee et al., 202433). Because their activities operate between formal and informal spheres, they are difficult to classify—sometimes resembling nonprofits, other times loose networks of individuals (Martinez, 200834). Building on previous work, this study examines the concept of zero responders: civilians who assume first-response functions before, or in place of, formal emergency response systems when official capacity is delayed, inaccessible, or overwhelmed. While earlier work used this term to describe passers-by or survivors acting in the immediate moments of crisis (Lemyre et al., 201635; Cocking, 20135; Cocking & Drury, 201436), this study extends the concept to the disaster context to capture residents and community members who engage in urgent, life- or property-saving action under conditions where formal response is absent, delayed, or insufficient, and prior to the emergence of structured co-production, which involves intentional partnerships between institutions and communities. Unlike co-production, zero response is pre-institutional, immediate, and often informal. In many cases, it becomes the starting point for later co-production once official linking mechanisms, such as volunteer registration systems or nonprofit intermediaries, are established (Krogh & Lo, 202437; Lejano, Haque, & Berkes, 202138).

Gaps in the Literature

Despite increased attention to social capital in disaster research, major gaps remain. Research often emphasizes bonding ties, but bridging and linking capital may be more critical where resources and power are unequally distributed (Behera, 202122). Cultural variation also matters, as collectivist traditions can strengthen resilience in ways not captured by standard models (Hawkins & Maurer, 201023). Likewise, Woolcock and Narayan (2000)39 argue for interventions tailored to the unique socioeconomic and cultural conditions of each community.

Yet, little is known about how social capital shapes the actions of zero responders in the earliest stages of disaster. This study addresses that gap by exploring the concept of zero responders and examining how traditional and digital forms of social capital facilitated spontaneous community response in the absence of official aid following Hurricane Ian.

Research Questions

Although forms of community social capital is well researched, effective ways to integrate social capital into formal disaster response and recovery policies and practices are not (Behera, 202122). Additionally, the evolving role of social media in building and mobilizing social capital during and after disasters needs further investigation (Kumari & Frazier, 202129). Prior research primarily examines social capital in long-term recovery efforts, but there is limited understanding of how social networks are activated immediately following a disaster and how these networks shape the effectiveness of grassroots response efforts.

To address these gaps, this study investigates how zero responders leveraged both traditional and digital forms of social capital in the aftermath of Hurricane Ian, focusing on the motivations, trust dynamics, and communication networks that shaped grassroots response efforts. Specifically, this study aims to answer the following research questions:

  1. What role did individuals play in grassroots response efforts after Hurricane Ian?

  2. How did individuals navigate and utilize different social networks to access and mobilize social capital following Hurricane Ian?

Research Design

This study employs a mixed-methods approach to investigate the role of social capital in disaster response following Hurricane Ian. We use a mixed-methods design to ensure a comprehensive understanding of the findings by integrating quantitative insights from surveys with qualitative depth from interviews and secondary sources (e.g., news articles, social media posts). The combination of these methods allows for a holistic examination of how and why zero responders participated in grassroots relief efforts.

Study Site and Access

This study focuses on ten counties affected by the storm’s initial landfall: Charlotte, Collier, DeSoto, Hardee, Highlands, Hillsborough, Lee, Pinellas, Sarasota, and Manatee. These counties were selected due to their inclusion in Florida’s disaster declaration (FEMA-4673-DR). We identified residents in these areas through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which lists them as qualifying for Public Assistance or Individual Assistance due to the severity of the storm’s impacts. This selection enables an analysis of how social capital functioned across diverse geographic, socioeconomic, and community structures, including rural, suburban, and urban areas.

Hurricane Ian, a Category 4 storm, caused widespread destruction of infrastructure, housing, and roadways, overwhelming local emergency response systems. With wind speeds reaching 150 mph and storm surges as high as 18 feet in some coastal areas, entire neighborhoods were inundated, and thousands of residents were left stranded. As the storm moved inland, severe flooding further complicated response efforts, cutting off major highways, trapping residents in their homes, and devastating agricultural sectors. The delayed arrival of official assistance in many areas reinforced the critical role of zero responders, who stepped in to provide life-saving rescues, distribute food and water, and support community-led recovery efforts.

We accessed research participants through multiple avenues. We recruited zero responders via community social media networks, including Facebook, NextDoor, and local disaster relief forums, where many had already been actively engaged in coordinating response efforts. We also used CommsConnect, the largest network of civilian responders in the United States, for survey and interview recruitment. Additionally, we contacted public officials, including emergency managers from the ten counties, directly, to schedule interviews with those in charge of local disaster response. The study also leveraged existing relationships with nonprofit organizations, local businesses, and grassroots community groups, which played key roles in post-disaster recovery.

To ensure reciprocity, the research team provided informational reports and infographics on the role of social capital in disaster response to the local emergency managers and emergency response organizations that participated in this study. We also shared findings with grassroots responders to help them strengthen their networks for future disasters. By engaging with both official responders and informal community networks, the study aims to generate practical insights to inform disaster preparedness, emergency coordination, and policy recommendations.

Surveys

Data Collection Methods

The survey component captures the perspectives of zero responders in the immediate aftermath of the storm. Using purposive and snowball sampling, we distributed surveys via CommsConnect channels, email networks, and social media platforms such as Facebook and Instagram. Throughout the four-week survey, we collected demographic information (age, race, gender, location, zip code, and education level) and included closed-ended questions. These questions asked about the types of assistance provided, including rescue operations, food and supply distribution, and relocation efforts. Our survey questions also explore the forms of social capital leveraged, including bonding, bridging, and linking ties, and measured levels of trust in government institutions and official response agencies. Finally, the survey examined the role of social media in coordinating relief efforts. We used Likert scales and multiple-choice formats to ensure a structured and quantifiable analysis. All participants provided informed consent before starting the survey and were notified of any risks. No compensation was offered in exchange for participation. In total, we collected 192 survey responses across the ten impacted counties.

Study Sample

The survey captures a diverse sample of zero responders who participated in Hurricane Ian relief. A majority of respondents were male (57%), with females comprising 34% and a small group (4%) preferring not to disclose their gender. Most participants were between 45–54 years (26%) and 55–64 years (29%). Smaller proportions represent younger adults aged 18–24 (4%), 25–34 (8%), and 35–44 (21%), as well as older adults aged 65 and above (8%).

In terms of race and ethnicity, the majority identified as White (44%), followed by Black/African American (21%) and Hispanic/Latino (14%), with smaller proportions identifying as Asian, Native American, or multiracial. Educational backgrounds varied, with most respondents holding a high school diploma (23%) or a bachelor's degree (22%). These demographic characteristics are presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Demographic Characteristics of Zero Responder Survey Participants**
Variable
n
%
Gender Male 109 57
Female 64 34
Prefer not to say / No response 19 10
Age 18–24 8 4
25-34 15 8
35-44 40 21
45-54 50 26
35-44 40 21
55–64 55 29
65+ 15 8
No response 9 5
Race/Ethnicity White 84 44
Black/African American 40 21
Hispanic/Latino 27 14
Other 41 21
Education High school or less 50 26
Some college 38 20
Bachelor’s or higher 57 30
Technical/Professional Certification 34 18
No response 14 7
Note. N = 192.

Semi-Structured Interviews

Data Collection Methods

To gain qualitative insights, we conducted 64 semi-structured interviews with two distinct groups: emergency managers/public officials and zero responders. We conducted 34 interviews with emergency managers and public officials and 30 interviews were with zero responders themselves, with each county having a minimum of four interviews. This dual-sample design provided a comparative perspective, capturing both the official response viewpoint and the lived experiences of community members who acted as zero responders.

We recruited participants by contacting county officials directly and through outreach to zero responders via CommsConnect. In order to preserve the voluntary nature of this study in line with minimal-risk research, no compensation was offered for participation. The interview protocol followed a semi-structured format, ensuring flexibility while still covering core topics. These included the collaboration between government agencies and grassroots responders, the effectiveness and challenges of community-led disaster relief efforts, the dynamics of trust and coordination between emergency managers and informal response networks, and recommendations for enhancing future disaster preparedness and response efforts. Interviews were conducted virtually via Zoom and Microsoft Teams, each lasting approximately 45 to 60 minutes.

Data Analysis

We transcribed interview recordings verbatim. Two research assistants coded the transcribed data and then analyzed the transcripts using NVivo qualitative data analysis software. NVivo facilitated systematic coding, theme development, and cross-comparison of patterns across data sources, ensuring transparency and rigor in the analysis. A Coding Comparison Query in NVivo yielded a percentage agreement of 82% and a kappa coefficient of 0.71, indicating a moderately strong level of consistency between coders. Survey data were cleaned and analyzed using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). While further statistical analyses were performed, this report includes only the descriptive results and percentages (see Table 1).

Secondary Source Analysis

Data Collection Methods

To supplement primary data, we reviewed 272 secondary sources, including news articles, social media posts, and government reports. We manually collected these sources across the relevant timeframe of one day prior to Hurricane Ian’s landfall through two weeks after the storm. Social media data from Facebook, Twitter, and NextDoor are included to examine how digital networks facilitated resource-sharing and coordination among zero responders.

Data Analysis

We analyzed secondary data through qualitative content analysis using NVivo to triangulate findings from surveys, interviews, and secondary sources, ensuring validity and reliability across multiple data streams.

Ethical Considerations and Researcher Positionality

This study was approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of South Florida (Approval # [STUDY005040], 11/21/2022). We obtained informed consent from all participants, and data are stored securely. We maintained anonymity and confidentiality by removing names, de-identifying transcripts, and reporting data in aggregate.

Researcher positionality also shaped this project. The lead researcher comes from one of the regions impacted by Hurricane Ian and personally experienced the disaster. While this background provided valuable insights and connections, it also introduced potential biases. We attempted to mitigate these biases by adhering to systematic data collection protocols, using multiple coders during qualitative analysis where possible, and maintaining reflexive memos throughout the research process. By addressing both ethical standards and researcher positionality, the study ensures methodological rigor, participant protection, and transparency in interpretation.

Findings

Roles of Zero Responders

Interviews and survey responses consistently highlight the wide-ranging roles zero responders took on after Hurricane Ian. Zero responders report engaging in activities such as rescuing stranded residents using personal boats and trucks, relocating livestock, and delivering hot meals to those without power. A male zero responder in his 40s described neighbors “using whatever they had on hand” to reach those cut off by floodwaters. Others organized supply drives, distributed water and food, cleared debris, and conducted wellness checks. These roles mirrored traditional first responder functions but were carried out spontaneously by neighbors, grassroots groups, and local businesses.

Social media posts from the immediate aftermath illustrate these roles vividly. As shown in the image below, one Arcadia resident announced a drive-through distribution of “dog food, water, some diapers, and dry foods” for families west of the river, showing how ordinary citizens mobilized resources and communicated needs rapidly through digital networks.

A Facebook screenshot of residents offering supplies to those isolated by flooding

A Facebook screenshot of residents offering supplies to those isolated by flooding. Photo Credit: Christa Remington September 30, 2022.

In community forums, affected families openly requested items such as blankets, toiletries, and baby supplies, while neighbors pledged to coordinate drop-offs or messaged them directly to arrange help. Others offered their homes as temporary shelters during the eye of the storm, posting that they had “an air mattress, generator, plenty of couch space, two rooms, and an open heart” for displaced families with children, in the instance of the screenshot below. Local businesses and churches likewise organized meals, with one community leader thanking neighbors for sponsoring a pop-up barbecue dinner to feed residents without electricity or functioning kitchens.

A screenshot of residents offering supplies in the Facebook community group “Let’s Hear It Arcadia

A screenshot of residents offering supplies in the Facebook community group “Let’s Hear It Arcadia. Photo Credit: Christa Remington September 30, 2022.

Survey data reinforces these observations, with respondents identifying multiple types of activities they engaged in. The most commonly reported actions include food and water delivery (55%), search and rescue (48%), wellness checks (35%), and debris removal (34%). As shown in Figure 1, smaller groups engaged in pet and livestock rescue, logistics coordination, and tarping damaged roofs. Taken together, the data and online accounts demonstrate that zero responders occupied multiple response functions, often bridging gaps left by formal systems.

Figure 1. Types of Help Provided by Zero Responders.

Figure 1

Note. N = 192.

Emergency managers acknowledge these roles, noting that grassroots actors frequently reach areas before official responders. However, they also express concerns about safety, liability, and potential interference with coordinated operations. A female emergency manager emphasized that “volunteers can be a huge asset if trained, but a risk if they’re not.” Many officials stress their preference for volunteers to act through formal channels, such as Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT) or the Medical Reserve Corps (MRC), where training and oversight could minimize risk.

Networks and Social Capital

In the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Ian, survival and relief depended on the webs of relationships that residents could access. These networks of trust, reciprocity, and obligation—what scholars describe as social capital—are not abstract concepts but living structures through which communities provided food, shelter, and safety. The analysis examines how zero responders leveraged bonding, bridging, and linking ties to mobilize aid and how these networks both empowered communities and strained relationships with formal emergency management systems.

Bonding Ties

Bonding ties, or relationships among family members, neighbors, and peers, are characterized by high levels of trust, frequent interaction, and a shared sense of obligation. These ties were particularly visible in rural areas, where dense, close-knit networks enabled rapid mutual aid. Operating horizontally among actors at the same social level rather than between citizens and formal authorities, their significance lies in their capacity to mobilize immediate, localized support (Granovetter, 198340). In this context, bonding ties facilitated swift assistance to affected individuals, reinforcing community resilience during the response phase. As one emergency manager, a male in his 50s, described, “everybody already knew each other” and acted quickly when needs arose, providing immediate life-saving help. Neighbors with trucks and boats carried out rescues, farm families pooled resources to relocate livestock, and kinship groups ensured that older adults were checked on after the storm. One zero responder recalled, “they [ a neighbor] didn’t even have to ask, we showed up as soon as we saw the house flooded.” These examples highlight how bonding capital functioned as a form of pre-existing trust and obligation that could be activated instantly. Importantly, bonding was not confined to face-to-face networks. Through social media, zero responders extended those familiar ties into digital spaces. The platforms enabled residents to quickly identify who was available to help, share neighborhood-level updates, and reinforce a sense of “we’re in this together.” In this way, digital social capital amplifies bonding ties by making them visible and actionable across scattered geographies. Survey data support these interview findings, with a majority of respondents reporting that help from neighbors and family was the most immediate and reliable form of assistance after the storm. This reflects the high trust placed in local relationships that enabled rapid, informal coordination across communities.

Churches, grassroots nonprofits, and local businesses facilitated bridging ties. Local nonprofit and faith-based groups mobilized hundreds of volunteers, both locally and from out of state, operating across denominational, cultural, and socioeconomic boundaries. A volunteer from a church explained, “We didn’t care who belonged to what church or neighborhood—we just saw people in need.” This bridging role mattered not only for distributing material aid but also for building solidarity across lines of difference. Survey responses reinforce this pattern, with many participants identifying churches and local nonprofits as their most trusted and accessible sources of assistance after the storm. Local businesses also stepped in by repurposing supply chains to deliver bottled water, ice, and meals to neighbors outside their normal customer base. Together, these forms of bridging capital demonstrate how social networks can expand beyond kinship and immediate proximity, bringing new resources and perspectives into hard-hit communities.

Linking Ties

Linking ties are critical for coordination. Social media platforms, such as Facebook and NextDoor, and communication networks like CommsConnect allowed residents to request help and coordinate resources in real time. Many participants describe Facebook as “the new 911,” with posts about stranded families or road closures often reaching volunteers before official channels could respond. CERT and MRC programs offer more formal linking structures, though their use varied widely across counties. Some managers admit that CERT was underutilized, while others see it as an essential way to train and integrate community volunteers. As one county official put it, “If we had more CERT-trained volunteers, we could have avoided some of the duplication and confusion. But in the counties where CERT was strong, it was a game changer.” Survey data align with these insights, showing that while respondents widely trusted local networks and digital platforms, fewer than half expressed confidence in government-led response efforts. This pattern underscores how digital communication tools partially compensated for weak formal linking structures, enabling faster information flow and coordination when institutional systems lagged. The unevenness of these linking mechanisms highlights both the potential and the limitations of formal programs in connecting grassroots energy with official systems.

Comparative Synthesis

The findings reveal both agreement and friction between formal emergency managers and zero responders. Both groups recognize that grassroots action was indispensable after Hurricane Ian, particularly in neighborhoods cut off from formal aid by flooding. However, opinions between the two groups diverge in how they understood that action.

Zero responders describe their work as necessary and compassionate, often framing it as a moral obligation to step in where there was a gap in formal aid. Several characterize their response as an act of human decency, emphasizing that they did not wait for permission to help. One volunteer explains, “We weren’t going to sit around and wait. People were begging for help online and we were that help.” For them, zero response is not just about filling a gap but about leveraging community trust and care in ways that formal systems could not.

Discussion

This study examined how zero responders leveraged social capital to mobilize aid in the aftermath of Hurricane Ian, addressing two central questions: what roles individuals played in grassroots response efforts and how they navigated different social networks to mobilize resources. Rather than treating grassroots action as peripheral, the findings demonstrate that informal networks—both traditional and digital—form the backbone of disaster response when institutional systems are delayed or distrusted. As disasters intensify and confidence in government wanes, these networks increasingly shape how communities organize themselves in moments of crisis. Zero responders performed life-saving and logistical roles typically associated with formal first responders—rescuing residents, distributing supplies, checking on vulnerable neighbors, and clearing debris. Their coordination often took place through social media, which transformed into an improvised command network where information and requests spread faster than official channels. This dynamic reveals a central tension: while grassroots action offers speed, adaptability, and empathy, it also challenges formal systems built on regulation and control. Emergency managers’ perspectives confirm this duality—recognizing zero responders as indispensable yet difficult to integrate within bureaucratic frameworks. Networks and social capital bonding, bridging, and linking ties each played distinct but interdependent roles. Bonding capital anchored immediate survival through kinship and neighborhood networks; bridging capital, expressed through churches, nonprofits, and local businesses, extended recovery across community boundaries; and linking capital—both formal (CERT) and digital (CommsConnect, Facebook)—enabled coordination when institutional response lagged. Survey results highlight the unevenness of these ties: respondents overwhelmingly trusted local actors while expressing skepticism toward government. This imbalance suggests that future preparedness strategies must address not only structural coordination but also the social trust that underpins it.

Implications for Theory

These findings advance social capital theory by illustrating how digital networks now function as hybrid spaces where bonding and bridging ties converge, forming what might be understood as digital linking capital. Although zero response represents cooperation, it also reflects a subtle resistance that emerges when institutional trust erodes. Understanding this interplay reframes grassroots response not as a temporary substitute for formal systems, but as a parallel governance structure built on trust, reciprocity, and need.

Conclusion

Implications for Practice or Policy

This study shows that zero responders are not peripheral actors but essential contributors during the critical window before formal aid arrives. Local governments should recognize them as legitimate parts of the response ecosystem. Policies that establish clear collaboration pathways, such as pre-disaster registration systems, accessible community responder training, and memoranda of understanding with grassroots groups, could improve coordination without undermining the flexibility that makes informal networks effective. Survey results also point to high levels of distrust in government, underscoring the need for transparent communication and equitable distribution of resources. Building trust before disasters is essential. Partnerships with nonprofits, faith-based organizations, and local businesses should also be prioritized, as these bridging networks were critical in reaching marginalized groups. Institutionalizing such practices can move disaster management toward more integrated, community-centered systems.

Limitations

This study has several limitations. Reliance on self-reported data introduces the possibility of recall bias and social desirability effects. Recruitment through social media may have skewed the sample toward more digitally connected individuals, underrepresenting those without regular internet access. Interviews, while rich in qualitative insights, reflected uneven representation across demographic groups, limiting the breadth of perspectives captured. These limitations temper the generalizability of findings but do not diminish the central insight: zero responders played indispensable roles shaped by necessity, distrust, and care.

Future Research Directions

Future research should expand beyond a single hazard event to examine zero responders in contexts such as wildfires, earthquakes, and technological disasters. Comparative studies between rural and urban communities are especially needed to assess how social capital functions differently across settings. Additional work should also consider zero response as acts of resistance and explore how this framing shapes relationships with formal institutions. Research into collaboration between zero responders, civilian response groups, and local governments could help identify best practices for integration. The uneven role of CERT programs deserves further study, particularly in how they bridge informal and formal systems. Finally, longitudinal research could track whether zero responders remain engaged in preparedness and recovery or if their contributions are event specific. Together, these lines of inquiry would build a more comprehensive understanding of grassroots disaster response and its role in modern emergency management.

Author Acknowledgments. I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to Mike White of CommsConnectUS for generously sharing his connections to zero responders and offering valuable perspective drawn from his experience as a retired first responder. His insight and introductions greatly strengthened the depth of this research. I am also deeply appreciative of Brandi Long of The Williamson Group Realty, whose willingness to use her social capital to connect our research team with impacted community members made this project possible. Their support and contributions exemplify the spirit of collaboration and community that underlies this work. 

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Suggested Citation:

Remington, C. L., Remington, C. R., Duckworth, C., & Havird, S. (2026). The Rise of the Zero Responder: Grassroots Disaster Response After Hurricane Ian. (Natural Hazards Center Quick Response Research Report Series, Report 372). Natural Hazards Center, University of Colorado Boulder. https://hazards.colorado.edu/quick-response-report/the-rise-of-the-zero-responder-grassroots-disaster-response-after-hurricane-ian


Acknowledgments

The Quick Response Research Award Program is funded by the National Science Foundation (NSF Award #1635593 and NSF Award #2536173). Opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations produced by this program are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the NSF or Natural Hazards Center.

Remington, C. L., Remington, C. R., Duckworth, C., & Havird, S. (2026). The Rise of the Zero Responder: Grassroots Disaster Response After Hurricane Ian. (Natural Hazards Center Quick Response Research Report Series, Report 372). Natural Hazards Center, University of Colorado Boulder. https://hazards.colorado.edu/quick-response-report/the-rise-of-the-zero-responder-grassroots-disaster-response-after-hurricane-ian