Natural Hazards Center
Institute of Behavioral Science University of Colorado

Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center
Special Publication 36

Return to the Hazards Center Home Page

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS AND EDITOR'S NOTE

ABSTRACT

PART 1:

1. INTRODUCTION

2. FRAMING AND ASSESSMENT

3. LOOKING BACK

4. THE 1997-1998 ENSO: SUMMARY OF IMPACTS

5. GOVERNMENTAL-INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE TO THE 1997-1998 ENSO

6. THREE COUNTRIES AND THE DISASTER MARGINALIZATION OF CIVIL DEFENSE: WHY?

7. CONCLUSION: REDAY FOR THE NEXT ENSO?

8. POSTSCRIPT: DECEMBER 1999

THE AUTHORS

The authors gratefully acknowledge support and assistance from the regional team office for Latin America and the Caribbean of the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, the International Hurricane Center at Florida International University, and the National Science Foundation. None of these organizations, however, bears any responsibility for statements of fact or interpretation in this report. That responsibility lies totally with the authors.

The ENSO-focused "institutional response" research reported in this special publication was carried out in 1997 and 1998 and originally drafted in mid-1998. With essentially the same focus, the research team was then reoriented to the Caribbean and Central America by Hurricane Georges and Hurricane Mitch in late 1998, which delayed publication of the ENSO research. The devastating mid-December 1999 floods in Venezuela, however, again highlighted institutional problems in mitigation, preparedness, and response in the Western Hemisphere.

The team's research report on Hurricane Georges and Hurricane Mitch and the institutional response problems in the Dominican Republic (Georges) and Honduras and Nicaragua (Mitch) will appear as a future special publication in this series.

Back to Contents

The South American countries of Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia have now experienced two major El Niņo Southern Oscillation (ENSO) events in the past 17 years. The first was in 1982-1983. The recently concluded second was in 1997-1998. Briefly reviewing the lessons learned/not learned (mostly not learned) from the 1982-1983 ENSO, this study 1) focuses on the most recent ENSO's impacts and governmental-institutional response in Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador, and 2) assesses likely institutional readiness for the next ENSO.

The principal finding is that while the civil defense organizations in the respective countries were the nominal "national emergency organizations" at the outset of the most recent ENSO, each was rapidly pushed to the sidelines ("marginalized") by one or more new but temporary governmental organizations charged with supposedly managing the response. The result was 1) confusion and duplication at the institutional level and 2) a serious loss of credibility and morale in each country's civil defense structure. This is hardly the combination one would seek for optimizing institutional readiness for the next ENSO.

Finally, but again hardly a surprise, in all cases the 1997-1998 ENSO became a major domestic media and political issue. In two of the countries, the most recent ENSO became part of either official (Ecuador) or unofficial (Peru) electoral campaigns. In the third case (Bolivia), it became enmeshed in inter-party coalition politics.

Back to Contents
Forward to Part I
Return to the Hazards Center Home Page