When it came to clear communication and unambiguous leadership in handling the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the administration’s devotion to transparency was little more than skin deep, according several draft reports released Tuesday by the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling.

Willful miscommunication, speciousness, and obfuscation, on the other hand, might have run as deep as the well itself. The report skewers the government for lack of veracity in communicating to the public and laissez-faire response leadership.

"By initially underestimating the amount of oil flow and then, at the end of the summer, appearing to underestimate the amount of oil remaining in the Gulf, the federal government created the impression that it was either not fully competent to handle the spill or not fully candid with the American people about the scope of the problem," the commission writes in a draft titled The Amount and Fate of the Oil.

The commission is far from the first entity to question government flow estimates. Almost from the first days of the spill, independent scientists publicized flow rates of more than thirteen times the "meager" 5,000 barrels a day cited by official sources. Even within the administration there was conflict, according to the New York Times, with the Office of Management and Budget denying a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration request to release its worst-case estimates.

Similarly, the scientific community met glowing White House reports in August—which claimed up to 75 percent of the spilled oil was gone—with a collective snort of derision.

The off-estimates are more than just a matter of bad faith and public relations. Because BP’s liability will be partially based on how much oil flowed into the Gulf, adequate estimates—or the lack of them—will be key.

“That meant the administration had an extra responsibility to do its own objective analysis," Joe Romm of Climate Progress is quoted as saying by National Public Radio. "It was a big deal, and it should have been pursued more systematically.”

The commission, established by the president in May, also questioned objectivity and accountability of the administration, indicating that BP was essentially in control of many aspects of the response.

“Investigating why people had the perception that BP was ‘running the show,’ the commission found that BP was, in fact, running the show,” wrote Grist’s Brad Johnson, citing report findings that in some instances the Coast Guard actually reported to BP employees. Rather than taking a strong leadership role and guiding response, Unified Command “primarily functioned as a national coordination and communications center to deal with high-level political and media inquiries,” the commission wrote.

In addition, the commission learned that BP had skirted the unified command in dispersing response funds directly to states and communities—whose responders had been ignored by federal officials—giving them “reason to believe that BP controlled the means and the methods of the response,” the report stated.

The commission expects to issue its final report on January 11, 2011. Discussions on its preliminary findings will be held October 13 and will be broadcast on the commission website.